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The purpose of this study is to examine the value relevance of intangibles namely; R&D 
investments, patent quality and patent count in explaining the variation in the firm’s IPO 
value and 1 year holding period returns. We use forward citation index, backward 
citation index and technology cycle time to proxy for the quality of patents. We also 
have four different constructs of patent counts namely, patents granted, patents pending, 
patents licensed and total number of patents.  
 
In addition, we examine the impact of patent counts and R&D investments on the 
different sub category of high tech firms i.e. Biotechnology, Computer Programming and 
Software, Communications and High Tech Manufacturing. 
 
We find that R&D intensity is useful in explaining 1 year holding period return. In 
addition, we find that the impact of patents pending and total number of patents differ 
across industries and are value relevant in explaining IPO value. Our results also reveal a 
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1.1 Justification of Study 
 
The relatively high market valuations, especially those of the technology and Internet 
firms, during the late 1990s raise the issue of whether these firms were rationally priced, 
especially with respect to their fundamental accounting information. This has led to 
many academics and investment bankers to question whether traditional valuation 
models remain valid in this new economy (Bhagat and Rangan, 2003; Core, Guay and 
Buskirk, 2003; McCarthy, 1999). In particular, Core et al. (2003) found that the 
explanatory power of traditional model has declined in the new economy. Studies by 
Demers and Lev (2001) and Trueman, Wong and Zhang (2000) have also found a 
weakening relationship between market values and financial information. 
 
Empirical studies have suggested the use of non-financial indicators such as patent 
counts and web traffic statistics when valuing companies in the technology sector (Amir 
and Lev, 1996; Trueman et al., 2000). In addition, there have been studies that show that 
citation statistics are better value indicators than R&D expenses and simple patent 
counts. (Trajtenberg, 1990; Deeds, Decarlios and Coombs, 1997).  
 
The proportion of IPOs that are tech stocks has increased from approximately 25% in the 
1980s to almost 40% during the 1990s. (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Furthermore, high 
tech firms going public are fundamentally different in that they are typically years away 
from any significant revenue stream, have very few tangible assets and are usually 
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sustaining significant account losses. (Damodaran, 2001). Given the growing number of 
high tech IPOs coupled with their interesting characteristics and the problems of valuing 
them in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) stage, it is interesting to examine if non-
financial information can help to explain the value of the firm during the IPO. A study 
that aims at explaining the valuation of the high-tech IPOs would be of interest to 
investors who intend to invest in high-tech stocks and entrepreneurs who have plans to 
take their companies public so that they can better understand the value drivers in their 
companies.   
 
Following Loughran and Ritter (2004), we do not consider Internet firms in the category 
of high tech. Moreover many studies such as Hand (2000), Trueman et al. (2000) and 
Barthov, Mohanram and Seethamraju (2002) focus solely on the valuation of Internet 
firms. These studies documented that the characteristics of Internet firms are very 
different from other firms. In addition, the value of Internet IPOs is driven by a different 
set of intangibles such marketing, web metrics such as page views, click-through rates or 
unique visitors (Hand, 2000). Furthermore, amongst many others, Hand (2000), Ofek 
and Richardson (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) have documented that there is a 
bubble in Internet valuation. Pastor and Veronesi (2004) have also claimed that there is 
unusually high uncertainty in the Internet firms’ future profitability. Thus there is 
probably a lot of noise in the valuation of Internet IPOs. In short, Internet firms are 
usually viewed as a separate category from high tech firms with different valuation 
metrics. Hence we exclude pure Internet firms in our study. The four main sub category 
of high tech firms in our sample are Biotechnology, Computer Programming and 
Software, Communications and High Tech Manufacturing.  
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1.2 Objectives of the study 
 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of the quality of patents, 
patent counts and R&D investments on the valuation of high tech IPOs and 1-year 
holding period return. We use Forward citation index, Backward citation index and 
Technology cycle time to proxy for the quality of patents. We also have four different 
constructs of patent counts namely, Patents Granted, Patents Pending, Patents Licensed 
and Total number of Patents. In addition, we examine the impact of patent quality and 
R&D investments on the different sub category of high tech firms i.e. Biotechnology, 
Computer Programming and Software, Communications and High Tech Manufacturing. 
 
1.3 Potential contributions to existing literature 
 
This study contributes to the existing literature in various ways. Core et al. (2003) 
conducted a study to compare the explanatory power of a valuation model in the new 
economy period (1995-1999) relative to earlier years for a large cross-section of publicly 
traded firms. They found that the explanatory power of traditional model has declined in 
the new economy. In contrast, our study fills in the gap to find out the value relevance of 
intangibles in explaining the valuation of high tech firms. 
 
Bhagat and Rangan (2003) found that IPO valuation function has changed in the new 
economy. In addition, their findings revealed that technology IPOs are valued 
differently. Our study extends further by examining the IPO valuation of high tech firms 
in greater detail. 
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In addition, Hirschey and Richardson (2004) found that patent citation information helps 
investors judge future profit earning potential of a firm’s scientific discoveries. This 
paper extends further by finding the impact of the patent citation information during IPO.  
 
Moreover, Deeds, Decarolis and Coombs (1997) examined the impact of firm specific 
characteristics on the value of biotechnology IPOs. As the high-technology industry and 
biotechnology industry do share several similar characteristics, we will investigate if the 
findings of Deeds et al. (1997) are applicable to the overall high-tech industry. Therefore 
our sample of 879 high-technology IPOs compares favorably with their sample of 92 
biotechnology firms. In addition, we include Forward citation index, Backward citation 
index, and Technology Cycle Time to proxy for the quality of the firms’ patents and 
scientific team. We also have four different constructs of patent counts. 
 
Furthermore, in a previous study, we found that the number of patents helps to explain 
the valuation of high tech IPO (Tan, 2003). Hence this study aims to conduct a more in 
depth analysis of patent count and patent quality. 
 
Our studies look at the overall high tech industry and hence compares favorably to other 
studies by Amir and Lev (1996), which focus on telecommunication industry, and Deeds 
et al. (1997), which focuses on Biotechnology industry. 
 
Lastly, we hand collected many variables (number of patents pending, number of patents 
issued, number of patents granted, management personnel with prior management 
experience, number of product under development, age of IPO firm, equity retained by 
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management, whether high risk is stated on cover) from the prospectuses individually to 
ensure best possible accuracy in the data. 
 
1.4 Scope of study 
 
In this study, the valuation of high-tech stocks listed on Nasdaq stock market is assessed. 
This empirical study uses 879 high-tech IPOs listed on Nasdaq stock market during the 
period January 1996 to December 2002. This timeframe is chosen because electronic 
prospectuses are only available on EDGAR after 1996. The study focuses on stocks 
listed on Nasdaq because Nasdaq is the leading stock exchange for high-technology 
stocks with 94.4% of the total high-tech newly listed stocks in U.S. 
 
1.5 Structure of Study  
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature on IPOs. 
Chapter 3 reports the data, methodology and hypotheses used in the study. We will 
report our findings in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes with a brief write-up on the 
implications of our empirical results, the limitations of our study and suggestions for 
possible further research. 
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2 Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides a review of existing literature that is relevant to our study. First we 
look at the traditional valuation models which include: asset based approach, discounted 
cash flow approach and multiples using relative valuation approach and the problems 
with using these approaches to value high tech IPOs. Subsequently, we examine the 
valuation models developed by past studies to value IPOs and high tech firms. Lastly, we 
will present a brief introduction to patents and its application process. 
 
2.1 Traditional valuation models 
 
There is an extensive literature that discusses the various firm valuation methods. The 
three main models include discounted cash flow (DCF) approach (value of a firm is 
considered to be the present value of its expected future payoffs), relative valuation 
approach (value of a firm is based on how similar assets are currently priced in the 
market) and asset based approach (value of a firm is indicated by the underlying value of 
the firm’s assets). In the following, we will discuss some of the problems using the 
valuation frameworks in high tech firms. 
 
2.1.1 Asset based approach 
 
This approach has little relevance in the high tech industry as most of its value is in its 
intangible assets and from growth opportunities (Kim and Ritter, 1999) 
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In addition, high-tech firms typically invest heavily in intangibles such as R&D, 
customer base creation and brand equity (Damodaran, 2001). Yet under generally 
accepted U.S. accounting principles, many types of intangible assets are not reported in 
firms’ financial statements. Hence with the large amount of intangibles, the task of asset 
valuation becomes more complicated. (Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis, 2001). 
 
2.1.2 Discounted Cash Flow Approach 
 
It is difficult to estimate the inputs (cash flows, growth rate, discount rates and asset life) 
of the discounted cash flow model for a high tech IPO firm. This is because most high 
tech firms have negative free cash flows due to either negative operating income or large 
reinvestment needs. Furthermore most of the value of these firms comes from future cash 
flows and terminal value.  
 
In addition, the estimation of the costs of equity and debt to calculate the discount rates 
tend to depend on historical data (Damodaran, 2001). This can be difficult since most 
high tech IPOs went public unusually early in their life cycles in the late 1990s (Schultz 
and Zaman; 2001). 
 
2.1.3 Multiples using relative valuation approach 
 
According to Damodaran (2001), there are two components to relative valuation. The 
first is the multiples approach i.e. prices have to be standardized, usually by converting 
them into multiples of earnings, book values of equity, or sales, to value assets on a 
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relative basis. The second is the comparable firm approach i.e. to find similar firms, 
which is difficult to do since no two firms are identical.   
 
Amongst others, Ohslon (1995) and Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997) examine the 
multiples approach. Ohslon (1995) expressed the value of the firm as a function of the 
earnings and book value of equity. He further showed that the market to book ratio is a 
function of the firm’s abnormal earnings generating power and thus reflects the firm’s 
growth potential. On the other hand, Collins et al. (1997) suggested that book value of 
equity play a more important role in the valuation of intangibles-intensive firms and 
when current earnings do not serve as a good proxy for future earnings. 
 
Several academic studies examine the comparable firm approach, mainly using P/E 
ratios. Boatsman and Baskin (1981) find that P/E model using the firm from the same 
industry with the most similar ten year average growth rate of earnings have better 
accuracy compared to one using a random firm from the same industry.  
 
In a more recent study, Kim and Ritter (1999) comment that most firms conducting IPOs 
in US were young companies, which have valuable growth options that were difficult to 
ascertain. To value young growth companies, they recommended the use of accounting 
numbers in conjunction with other multiples of comparable firms as benchmarks. Kim 
and Ritter (1999) in their empirical work used a sample of 190 domestic operating 
companies IPOs from 1992 to 1993. They studied two groups of firms for their 
comparables: 1) recent IPOs as determined by four-digit SIC codes, and 2) firms chosen 
by a research boutique. Their findings revealed that comparable firms multiples such as 
price to earnings and price to sales of comparable firms are of limited use if historical 
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numbers rather than forecasts are used. They further suggested that additional 
idiosyncratic factors might be needed for using the comparable firm approach in valuing 
IPOs. Nevertheless, their study has shed lights on industry specific ratios such as price to 
sales in the valuation of young growth firms.  
 
However for relative valuation approach to work well, a comparable group has to be 
available. In the case of high tech IPOs, many of them represent first of their kind and 
thus there are no close competitors or peer groups. 
 
2.2 Empirical valuation model 
 
The negative earnings and the presence of intangible assets is often used as a rationale 
for abandoning traditional valuation models and developing new ways that can be used 
to justify investing in the technology firms. 
 
Some of the models developed by past studies to explain the valuation of IPO include the 
signaling model, ex-ante model (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Rock 1986). In addition, there 
are also studies that explain the valuation of IPO using non-financials such as patents, 
market penetration rates (Amir and Lev, 1996; Deeds et al, 1997).  
 
2.2.1 Signaling model 
 
According to theories on market signaling mechanisms, certain variables or actions send 
signals to potential investors about the capabilities and the future value of the firms 
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(Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973). In the case of IPOs, issuers may try to enhance the 
credibility of the share offer through various signaling mechanisms so as to mitigate the 
problem of informational asymmetry. However the evidence supporting signaling theory 
is mixed. In the following section, we will review a selection of signaling mechanisms 
postulated by past studies. 
 
Leland and Pyle (1977) suggested that an issuer could use his percentage of equity 
retained as a signal to outside investors. By holding a high fraction of equity, the 
entrepreneur transmits his confidence to prospective investors about the quality of the 
firm. Hence the value of the firm perceived by prospective investors increases as the 
number of shares held by issuers grows. This argument is further supported by Downes 
and Heinkel (1982), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch 
(1989). However, studies by Keloharju (1993) and Michaely and Shaw (1994) 
documented no relationship between underpricing and owner’s retention of shares. In our 
study, the percentage of equity retained is included in our multivariate regressions as a 
control. 
 
Booth and Smith (1986) proposed the certification hypothesis, which suggest that the 
presence of a third party of high reputation can help reduce uncertainty. Such external 
agents include venture capitalists (Barry, Muscarela, Peavy and Vetsuypens, 1990; 
Megginson and Weiss, 1991), reputable underwriters (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Michaely 
and Shaw, 1994) and reputable auditors (Beatty, 1989).  
 
Klein (1996) investigates the usefulness of prospectus information in the valuation of 
IPOs in the period 1980-1991. She finds that the prestige of the underwriters is positively 
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related to the offering price and the closing price one week after the IPO. It is often 
assumed that issuers use the quality of underwriters to eliminate some of ex ante 
uncertainty and to signal favorable private information. (Titman and Trueman, 1986; 
Carter and Manaster, 1990). We will use the presence of top underwriter as a control. 
 
Venture capitalists help to certify that the firm discloses truthful information, thereby 
reducing information asymmetry (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989). Barry et al. (1990) and 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) found that the presence of venture capitalists acts as a 
positive signal for high tech IPOs.  
 
This certification role by venture capitalists serves as a positive signal for IPO firms. 
This is because venture capitalists have equity holdings in the company and have usually 
developed a working relationship with the management team. Their monitoring ability is 
deemed stronger than other financial intermediaries such as underwriters who typically 
work with the issuing firms for only a few months. In addition, these venture capitalists 
tend to hold board seats and participate in the management of the firm as well as provide 
informal advice to help the growth of the issuing firm / investees (Barry et al., 1990). 
Furthermore, venture capitalists’ reputation is more valuable than potential gains from 
certifying falsely represented information since venture capitalists’ past performance and 
reputation are of utmost importance in their future ability to raise new funds (Sahlman, 
1990).  
 
However Francis and Hasan (2001) found in a sample of 415 venture backed IPOs and 
428 non-venture backed IPOs that the average initial return of 13.50% of VC backed 
IPOs is significantly higher than the average initial return of 10.06% for non-venture 
Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
12  
backed IPOs. They argue that if the presence of venture capitalists infers good quality, 
then these higher quality issues should be more underpriced so that future seasoned 
equity will fetch a more favorable price. This seems to be in conflict with the argument 
that the presence of venture capitalists can act as a signaling agent of good quality. 
 
In addition, the number of venture capitalists, i.e. the syndication of investments by 
venture capitalists, is sometimes used as a signal for firm quality (Lerner, 1994). The 
market associates larger number of venture capitalists with good firm quality as more 
venture capitalists are willing to place bets on the firm. Syndication provides more 
capital to the firm for its current and future needs. It also increases the monitoring level 
and improves the chance of the firm becoming successful in the future (Barry et al., 
1990; Wright and Robbie, 1998). The number of top venture capitalists involved in the 
IPO is added as a control in our study. 
 
2.2.2 Ex-ante model 
 
Rock (1986) notes that investors are differentiated by the amount of information they 
possess about the true value of an issue. The informed investors possess perfect 
knowledge of the issuing firms while the uninformed investors do not. 
The uninformed investors thus face a winner’s curse. They face competition from 
informed investors for good shares (likely to be profitable in the aftermarket), but stand a 
greater chance of being allocated more bad shares (overpriced issues) as informed 
investors would avoid bidding for these overpriced issues. Thus issuers must underprice 
to induce the uninformed investors to participate in the IPO market. Underpricing of new 
Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
13  
issues and allowing for positive first day returns also acts as compensation for informed 
investors for their information production during the roadshow.  
 
In an extension of Rock’s (1986) model, Beatty and Ritter (1986) postulate that 
underpricing is positively related ex-ante uncertainty of the issue. They explained that 
the greater the ex-ante uncertainty due to information asymmetry of an issue’s true value, 
the more investors will want to be informed and the more intense the winner’s curse 
phenomenon.  
 
In short, underwriters have to underprice the IPO more given a greater uncertainty in 
valuation of the IPO. We will use age as a proxy for ex-ante uncertainty of the high tech 
IPO in our study 
 
2.2.3 Valuation using non financial information 
 
There are many studies that examine the role of non-financial information in the 
valuation of high-tech firms. We will present a selection of the more relevant papers. 
 
Deeds et al. (1997) examined the valuation of biotechnology IPOs that are listed from 
1982 to 1992. In their sample of 92 biotechnology IPOs, they found that where the firm 
is located, number of products in the pipeline, the capabilities of the scientific team, 
using citation analysis as proxy, to have a significant and positive relationship with the 
value of the firm’s IPO. The value of the firm’s IPO is defined as the IPO net proceeds.  
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In addition, in my previous study, I found that the number of products under 
development has a positive and significant impact on the IPO value. I argued that the 
number of products in development or in the “pipeline” is a common indicator of 
technological competence or expertise. The strength of a firm’s pipeline is a positive 
signal of the company’s future cash flows. In addition as the number of products under 
development signals the company’s future cash flows, according to the signaling theory, 
positive signals help to mitigate the problems of information asymmetry. (Tan, 2003). 
Hence we will include the number of products under development in our regression 
models as a control. 
 
Studies by Sandberg and Hofer (1987) and MacMillan, Zemann and Narasimha (1985) 
indicated the importance of experience factors. In the case of high-technology firms, the 
relationship between the management team experience and performance becomes a 
crucial part of the firm’s competitive strategy (Stuart and Abetti, 1987; Wilbon, 1999). It 
is suggested that higher levels of managerial experience will lead to higher probability of 
venture success. This is because the experience would prepare them for a wide range of 
problems confronting their firms. Furthermore, Tan (2003) discovered that the number of 
management personnel with prior management experience has a positive and significant 
relationship with IPO value. Hence we will include the number of management 
personnel with prior management experience as a control in our regression models. 
 
Wilbon (1999) found that the intellectual property rights, research and development 
spending, as well as having technology-experienced executives to be relevant in 
explaining the performance of computer software-related IPO firms. 
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Amir and Lev (1996) conducted a study on the value relevance of non-financial 
information on the U.S. wireless communication industry. In their sample of 14 publicly 
traded cellular companies, they found that financial information of firms in fast-changing 
technology-based industries is of limited value to investors while non-financial 
indicators such as market penetration rates and growth proxy (percentage of company’s 
customer base out of the total available market) are highly relevant. 
 
Trueman et al. (2000) examined the role of non-financial data on a sample of 63 publicly 
traded Internet firms covering the period September 1998 to December 1999. They found 
that financial information is of little use in the valuation of Internet stocks. However their 
measures of Internet usage provide significant incremental explanatory power for stock 
prices. 
 
Demers and Lev (2001) explored the various value-drivers of business-to-consumer 
Internet share prices before and after the burst of the Internet bubble. They found that 
web traffic metrics are value-relevant in explaining the share prices. 
 
Ittner and Larcker (1998) also examined the role of non-financial data. They studied the 
relation between customer satisfaction measures and market values, and looked into the 
ability of these measures to predict revenues. Deng, Lev and Narin (1999) explored the 
usefulness of patent citations for predicting future market-to-book ratios and stock 
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2.3 Introduction to Patents  
 
A patent, issued by United States Patent and Trademark Office, represent a limited 
government grant of a property right to the inventor to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, selling or importing the invention throughout U.S. The term of a 
patent is 20 years from the filing date, however the protection starts only when the patent 
is granted. The time from filing to the time when a patent is granted usually takes about 
1.5 to 2 years. In order for an invention to be patentable, the invention must be nontrivial 
i.e. must not be obvious to a skilled practitioner of the relevant technology, and it must 
be useful i.e. has potential commercial value.1  
 
There are three types of patents namely, utility patents, design patents and plant patents. 
Utility patent is granted to discovery or invention of new and useful process, machine, 
article of manufacture, or compositions of matters, or any new useful improvement 
thereof. Design patents may be granted to anyone who invents a new, original, and 
ornamental design for an article of manufacture. Lastly, plant patents are granted to 





When a patent is granted, an extensive public document is created. The document 
contains detailed information about the invention, the inventor(s), the assignee i.e. the 
organization to which the inventor assigns the patent right (usually his employer), and 
the “prior art” of the invention i.e. references or citations which include previous patents 
                                                
1 Adapted from United States Patent and Trademark office website at www.uspto.gov 
2 Adapted from United States Patent and Trademark office website at www.uspto.gov 
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and other published material that describe aspects of the relevant technology that were 
previously publicly known. The specification must conclude with a claim or claims 
highlighting the subject matter, which the applicant regards as the invention. Together, 
both the patent claims and the citations delimit the property right that the patent 
represents. 
 
The cost to get a U.S patent is made of several components. These include the cost to 
prepare and file a patent application, various prosecution costs, and the issue fee. After 
the patent has been granted, keeping the patent in force requires paying maintenance fees 
to the U.S. Patent Office after 3 1/2, 7 1/2, and 11 1/2 years. The filing fee, depending on 
the number of claims in the application, ranges from about US$400 to US$1,000 or 
more. The main cost item in the patent application is the professional charges by the 
patent attorney or agent preparing the patent application and it ranges from US$2000 to 
US$10,000 depending on the complexity of the patent.3 In addition, according to 
Poynder, Goslinger and Carter, the lifetime costs of maintaining a worldwide coverage 
for a patent is approximately U$250,000. It is evident that a patent is costly to file and 
maintain. Therefore assuming that all companies are rational and file a patent when the 
potential value exceeds its costs, the patent in itself should be indicative of some value. 
 
 
                                                
3 Adapted from Oppedahl & Larson LLP’s website at http://www.patents.com/cost.htm#patent 




3.1 Data Definitions 
3.1.1 Definition of High-technology firms 
Table  3.1 Definition of high-technology firms in past studies 
 Our Study 




Deeds et al. 
(1997) 
Sample period 1996-2002 1980 - 2000 1996 1982 - 1992  
No. of high-
tech firms 
879 2128 31 92 
283 - Drugs     283 
357 - Computer & Office 
equipment 
3571, 3572, 3575, 
3577, 3578 
    
366 - Communication 
equipment 
3661, 3663, 3669     
367 - Electronic 
components 
3674     
3812 - Navigation 
equipment 
3812     
3823/ 5/ 6/ 7/ 9 - 
Measuring and controlling 
device 
3823, 3825, 3826, 
3827, 3829 
    
3841/ 5 - Medical 
instrument 
3841, 3845   384 
481 - Telephone 
communications 
4812, 4813     
489 - Communication 
services 
4899     
737 - Computer 
programming & software 
7370, 7371, 7372, 
7373, 7374, 7375, 
7378, 7379 




as high-tech  
873 - Research testing     873 
Other 
definitions 
 Internet IPOs   
 
As shown in Table  3.1, our sample compares favorably with past studies as we 
encompass all the firms that they classify as high-tech. Following Loughran and Ritter 
(2004); we exclude Internet IPOs under the category of high-tech.  
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3.1.2 Sample data and Data sources 
 
The IPOs included in this sample must fulfill the following criteria: 
1. Listed in the Nasdaq stock exchange.  
2. Listed from January 1996 to December 2002. This is because Edgar’s online 
prospectuses only started in 1996.   
3. The IPOs listed must have the SIC codes defined earlier and it must be a newly listed 
firms.  
4. Unit offerings, American Depository receipts (ADRs), Spin offs and non-U.S. dollar 
listed high-tech firms are excluded so as to achieve a more homogenous sample.  
 
After applying above filters, we have 884 high-tech companies. However we are unable 
to obtain the prospectuses of 5 of these companies and have to exclude them from the 
study. Thus a final sample of 879 high-tech companies listed on Nasdaq from 1996 to 
2002 is used to study the valuation of high-tech IPOs. 
 
The data required is obtained from the following sources: 
1. Security Data Company (SDC) United States New Issues Database: 
Data collected are: Company Name, offer date, net proceeds. 
2. Edgar Electronic Retrieval Services- Prospectuses 
Data that were hand collected are as follows: equity, total assets, revenue, R&D expenses 
for the year prior to IPO. Total number of shares offered, post issue share outstanding, 
net proceeds, year of incorporation, number of products and services under development, 
number of patents, number of people in management team with PhD/Masters, number of 
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people in management team with prior management experience and the venture 
capitalists involved and the lead underwriter of the issue. 
3. United States Patent and Trademark Office website (www.uspto.gov) 
To extract the list of patents (patent number) owned by the issuing companies. 
 
4. NUS patent database 
Data collected are: U.S. Patent Number, Forward Citation Index, Backward Citation 
Index, Patents’ attributes. 
 
3.2 Regression Models  
 
We will run multivariate regressions. Multivariate regression takes into account the 
different factors that may affect the value of the dependent variable. In examining the 
valuation using other factors such as age of the firm, venture presence as control 
variables, we can isolate the effect of the number of patents, patents quality and R&D 
capital. Table  3.2 provides a summary of the variables used in our study and their 
definitions. We will elaborate on how the variables are derived under hypothesis in 
Section 3.3. A list of control variables is included based on past literature.  
 
In addition, we will run the regression on citation statistics using a matched pair sample. 
This is because out of the 879 companies, using assignee search in NUS patent database, 
we retrieved 1450 patents. However after matching the patent issue date to the IPO issue 
date, only 492 patents remained. These 492 patents were then matched with their 
assignee i.e. the IPO firms and finally we arrived at 55 IPOs that has patents granted to 
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them prior to their IPO.
4
 From the prospectuses, we found 288 firms that reported that 
they have patents. One reason for the discrepancy could be that the patents were filed 
under the inventor name and hence was not reflected in the Assignee list. Another 
possible explanation would be that sometimes the firm does not state explicitly if the 
patent is a foreign or U.S. patent. If the patent is a foreign patent, it would not be 
reflected in the NUS patent database. However such a patent will be included in our 
count of patents granted. In addition, some firms do not distinguish between patents 
granted and patents pending hence that could also be a possible reason for the 
discrepancy. 
 
Thus since there were only 55 out of 879 firms with citation data, to mitigate the problem 
of skewness in the data, we use the method of matched pair sample. We match the firms 
by 1) Industry group, 2) Size of firm using number of employees as a proxy and 3) year 
of issue.5 The firms in the matched pair sample are listed in Appendix 1.
                                                
4 We were mindful that the Assignee name in the NUS patent database is the name of the company at the 
time it filed for patent and is not updated when the company changes its name. Hence, we noted all the 
name changes from the prospectuses and performed the assignee search using both old and new names. 
5 Number of employees is used as a proxy for size because many firms in our sample have low or zero 
revenue and negative equity. 
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Table  3.2 Definition of the independent variables used in the regressions 
Variable Definition of variable 
Dependent variables 
LOFF 
Following Bhagat and Rangan (2003), we use offer price multiply by post-IPO 
shares outstanding. We take the natural logarithm to control for skewness. 
LFST 
Following Bhagat and Rangan (2003), we use the first day closing price 
multiply by post-IPO shares outstanding. We take the natural logarithm to 
control for skewness. 
AHPR 
The 1-year average holding period return of the IPO firm. (Refer to Appendix 2 
for a detailed explanation of the computation of the AHPR.) 
Test Variables 
RNDINT 
The R&D intensity calculated by dividing the R&D expenses over total assets 
for the year prior to IPO. It is used as an indication of the prospects of future 
patents. 
Quantity of patents: 
P_ISSUE The number of patents granted to the company. 
P_PEND The number of patents that is pending for approval. 
P_LICENSE The number of patents that the company has licensed. 
P_TOTAL 
The total number of patents that the company has i.e. the summation of the 
patent issued, patent pending and patent licensed. 
Quality of patents using the following as proxies: 
FC1 
The forward citation index i.e. average number of times cited by others within 
1 year that patent is issued. 
TTFC 
The forward citation index i.e. average number of times cited by others from 
the time patent is issued to the IPO date.. 
BCI The backward citation index i.e. number of times citing others. 
TCT 
The technology cycle time, it measures the average of the technology cycle 
time of all the patents granted to the company. The technology cycle time of a 
patent is the median age in years of earlier U.S patents referenced on the front 
page of a U.S. patent. 






Age of company is measured as the year company went IPO less the year 
company is founded. Used as a proxy for ex-ante uncertainty. 
EMPLOYEE Number of employees in the company used as a proxy for size.6  
HIRISK 
As a proxy for the perceived level of risk. HIRISK = 1 if the prospectus’s cover 
page has a boldface warning that the issue involves high risk, and 0 otherwise. 
EQRET Total fraction of equity retained by management after IPO. 
NASDAQ Average Nasdaq returns for the 2 weeks before firm’s IPO to proxy market momentum.  
NOTOPVC 
Number of top venture capitalists as stated under principal shareholders 
sections.7 
UREP UREP = 1 if the lead underwriter is one of the top underwriters.8 
PRODUCT 
The number of products and services under development stated in the Business 
section. 
MGTEXP 
The number of management executive with prior management experience. 
Management experience is defined as holding positions at the management level 
(i.e. Chief Executive Officer, Vice Presidents and heads of departments.) 
BIO 
Dummy variable. Is 1 if the IPO firm is in the Biotechnology industry, 0 
otherwise. 
CPS 
Dummy variable. Is 1 if the IPO firm is in the Computer Programming and 
Software industry, 0 otherwise. 
HTM 
Dummy variable. Is 1 if the IPO firm is in the high tech manufacturing industry, 
0 otherwise. 
COM 
Dummy variable. Is 1 if the IPO firm is in the Communications industry, 0 
otherwise. Communication industry is used as the base industry in the 
regressions. 
 
                                                
6 We use number of employees as a proxy because many of the high tech firms have few assets, no revenue 
and negative equity. 
7 We use the list of top Venture Capitalists identified by Lange, Bygrave,  Nishimoto, Roedel and Stock 
(2001). 
8 We use the list of top underwriters’ identified by Lange, Bygrave,  Nishimoto, Roedel and Stock (2001). 
The top underwriters are: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, CS-First Boston, Goldman Saachs, BankBoston-
Robertson Stephens, Hambrecht and Quist, Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette. 
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3.3 Hypothesis  
3.3.1 Industry factors 
Cross-sectional studies in the US market by Ritter (1991) revealed that initial returns as 
well as after market performance vary widely across industries. Initial return is defined 
as the percentage price changes from offer price to closing price at end of first trading 
day. In their sample of 1526 IPOs studied, initial returns was the lowest (3.7%) for 
financial institutions; 6.3% for the airline industry; 7.6% for retail; 13.67% for 
computers; 17% for wholesalers; and 21% for scientific instruments. 
 
In addition, Cockburn and Griliches (1988) found evidence that the effectiveness of 
patents, market’s valuation of firm’s past R&D and patenting performance varies across 
industries. Hence we would expect R&D, number of patents and patent quality to affect 
the valuation of IPO in the Biotechnology, High Tech Manufacturing, Computer 
Programming & Software and Communications industries differently. Therefore we will 
include the interaction term between industry and the various test variables in our 
regression models. 
 
3.3.2 Research and development capital 
 
Several studies have linked R&D expenditures to increases in market value (Hirschey, 
1982; Hirschey and Wegandt, 1985; Pakes, 1985). In these studies, the level of R&D 
expenditures is viewed as an intangible asset of the firm and therefore contributes to the 
success of the firm. In addition, various studies have also found that positive share 
responses are observed when there are announcements of increased R&D (Bublitz and 
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Ettredge, 1989; Chan, Martin and Kensinger, 1990). Lev and Sougiannis (1996) have 
also found a positive relationship between R&D capital and stock returns. Thus we can 
see that the market views the level of R&D expenditures as an indication of the 
intangible assets of the firm. Ho, Keh and Ong (2004) found a positive relationship 
between R&D intensity and one year stock returns for manufacturing firms but not for 
non manufacturing firms. 
 
However, Deeds et al. (1997) did not document a significant positive relationship 
between R&D spending and IPO value in the biotechnology industries. They argued that 
the lack of significant relationship might be due to the lack of credibility in simple 
accounting data as a signal to investors as there is no verification of effectiveness or 
efficiency with which firms are using their resources. In a previous study, we also did not 
find a positive relationship between R&D spending and IPO value in the high tech 
industry (Tan, 2003). However, Cockburn and Griliches (1988) found that the impact of 
R&D varies across industries. Hence we will re-examine the effects of R&D in this study 
by including the industry dummies and the interaction term between industry and R&D. 
 
Although many studies have suggested the use of R&D capital, for reasons of parsimony 
and that it is impossible to have an economically driven amortization rate, we use R&D 
expenses to total assets for the year prior to IPO instead of capitalized R&D to total 
assets as a measure of R&D intensity (Lev and Sougiannis; 1996, Ho et al.; 2004) This 
measure is similar to the one used by Ho et al. (2004) but we use total asset as the scaling 
factor instead of sales because many of the firms in our sample are young firms with 
little or zero sales. In fact, there were 60 firms without sales figure for the year prior to 
IPO. 
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Since there is inconclusive empirical evidence on the impact of R&D, we will look into 
the relationship later in the findings and analysis chapter. 
 
3.3.3 Number of patents 
 
Patents represent a limited government grant of exclusive rights. The protection period is 
usually 17 to 18 years after taking into account the time for USPTO to approve the patent 
Therefore, the market will use the number of patents controlled by the firm as an 
indicator of the value of a firm’s intangible assets. In addition, many researchers, such as 
Trajtenberg (1990) and Griliches, Hall and Pakes (1991) suggested the use of the number 
of patents as an indication of value. Intellectual property rights are effective in creating 
barriers to entry for competitors who may introduce similar products to the market to 
take advantage of R&D investments made by others. Firms in the high-technology 
industries rely on a combination of patents, copyrights, trademark laws, trade secrets, 
confidentiality procedures, and contractual provisions to protect their proprietary rights, 
which are often their most marketable assets. (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter, 
1987). Pakes and Griliches (1984) and Pegels and Thirumurthy (1996) argued that 
patents are useful in assessing the technological competitiveness of the firm and are good 
indicators of advances in technical knowledge. They also found empirical evidence that 
the number of patents contribute significantly to increased firm performance.  
 
Hence we hypothesize that: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the number of patents granted and the firm’s 
IPO value. 
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H2: There is a positive relationship between the number of patents granted and the firm’s 
1-year AHPR. 
 
As many of the firms in our sample are relatively young and the process of filing a patent 
is lengthy, many firms have not been granted any patents hence we will also examine if 
the number of patents pending affect the IPO value. We will also test the number of 
patents licensed and total number of patents the company has with the firm’s IPO value 
and 1 year AHPR. The number of patents pending and the number of patents licensed are 
collected from the prospectuses under the section Business-Intellectual property. 
 
3.3.4 Citation statistics 
 
Product development in high technology environments is increasingly being driven by 
basic scientific research (Dasgupta and David 1994). Therefore quality of a firm’s 
scientific team is critical to the product development process and critical to investors’ 
evaluation of the firm’s future prospects. However it is difficult to measure the quality of 
the scientific research team. Citation analysis is one method of judging research quality 
and is well known in the academic community. Deeds et al. (1997), Hirschey, 
Richardson and Scholz (2001) have found that citation statistics are useful indicators of 
research quality. Hirschey and Richardson (2004) also found that citation information 
helps to judge future profit earning potential of a firm’s scientific discoveries. A citation 
in the patent text show how the claimed invention differs from the prior art and defines 
the limitation on the scope of the property rights established by the patent claims.  
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3.3.4.1 Forward citation index  
 
Trajtenberg (1990) findings revealed that citation-weighted patent counts are highly 
correlated with the R&D output and concluded that patent citations demonstrate the 
technological impact of a particular innovation and its importance in a specific area. 
Citation data have also been used to assess the quality of the scientific team in the 
Biotechnology industry (Deeds et al 1997). In addition, Van der Eerden and Saelens 
(1991) discussed the use of citations as indicators of research group performance and the 
quality of the scientific research being undertaken by the group, as well as a tool to guide 
competitive assessment.  
 
Citation analysis uses the number of times a study is cited as an indication of the 
importance of work to the field i.e. the more frequent a study is cited, the more important 
and hence the higher the quality of the work. The potential significance of patent 
citations can be inferred from the following quotation: 
 
During the examination process, the examiner searches the pertinent portion of the 
“classified” patent file. His purpose is to identify any prior disclosures of technology… 
which might anticipate the claimed invention and preclude the issuance of a patent; 
which might be similar to the claimed invention and limit the scope of patent protection; 
or which, generally, reveal the state of the technology to which the invention is 
directed… If such documents are found they are made known to the inventor and are 
“cited” in any patent which matures from the application… Thus the number of times a 
patent document is cited may be a measure of technological significance. (Office of 
Technology Assessment and Forecast, 1976, p167) 




Therefore we can see that the number of citations a firm has is an indication of the 
quality of the firm’s scientific capabilities.  Firms with a higher level of citations should 
have higher quality scientists and in turn a more productive R&D team. These 
capabilities will be transmitted to potential investors via the reputations of the firm’s 
research team. Firm’s patents that are more highly cited will have a superior reputation, 
which will in turn signal investors that the firms’ scientific capabilities and projects are 
of a high quality. 
 
Hence we hypothesize that: 
H3: There is a significant and positive relationship between the Forward Citation index 
and the firm’s IPO value. 
H4: Forward Citation index is positively related to the firm’s 1-year AHPR. 
 
As we have many young firms in our sample, we use forward citation count within 1 
year of patents’ issue i.e. the average number of times the company’s patents are cited by 
others within 1 year of issue and is denoted as FC1. However the patent filing process is 
lengthy and usually takes up to 2 years. Hence for the forward citation count to be 
meaningful, we will also take the average number of times the company’s patents are 
cited by others within 5 years of patent’s issue denoted as TTFC (total forward citation). 
For the 390 firms in our sample that are less than 5 years of age, we use the total forward 
count up to the time the firm went IPO.  
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3.3.4.2 Backward citation index  
 
Backward Citation Index measures the number of times a particular patent cites previous 
patents as prior art. Intuitively we would expect a positive relationship between 
Backward citation index and firm value as the more times a particular patent cites 
previous patents as previous research, it is likely to encompass a wider range of research 
and is an indication of high patent quality. However, Lee (2001) found that there is a 
negative relationship between backward citations and returns for his sample of 
telecommunication stocks. He argued that when a patent cites a lot of previous work in 
the research, it is likely that the innovation is a slight incremental contribution to the 
current technology. In addition, more citations of previous research will reduce the scope 
of claims for the patent, thus indicating a less valuable research. 
 
Since there is insufficient empirical evidence on the impact of backward citation index to 
come up with the hypothesis, we will look into the relationship later in the findings and 
analysis chapter. 
 
BCI (Backward Citation Index) = an average count of the total number of citing of other 
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3.3.4.3 Technology Cycle Time 
 
A final measure of inventive output quality examined in this paper is the “Technology 
cycle time” (TCT) indicator. TCT is defined as the median age in years of earlier U.S 
patents referenced on the front page of a U.S. patent. TCT represents the amount of time 
that has elapsed between when a current patent and the previous generation of patents 
were issued. TCT is essentially a measure of cycle time between a current patent and the 
prior state of knowledge. Emerging technologies have short cycle times, four years or 
less, whereas more mature technologies can display TCT that averages 15 or more years 
(Hirschey and Richardson, 2001). 
 
Intuitively we would expect TCT to be positively related to market values. This is 
because the expected economic life of a firm’s patents is a positive function of TCT to 
the extent that the slow pace of historically slow-moving technology is a useful indicator 
of the speed of future invention and innovations. However, Hirschey and Richardson 
(2001) and Hirschey, Richardson and Scholz (2001) found that TCT is negatively related 
to market values of the firm. They argued that TCT represents the speed of innovation, 
companies with shorter TCT than their competitors are advancing more quickly from 
prior technology. Hence companies with short TCT should have a higher firm value.  
 
As there is insufficient empirical evidence to hypothesize the impact of technology cycle 
time, we will look into the relationship later in the findings and analysis chapter. 
 




This chapter presents the various data required for this study. Multivariate regressions 
are utilized to examine the impact of the various factors. We have also formulated the 
hypotheses to be tested. Table  3.3 shows the summary of the hypotheses and the 
expected sign of the variables. 
 
Table  3.3 Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Measures of Intangibles Hypothesis Previous studies 
R&D intensity ? Lev and Sougiannis (1996) 
  Ho et al. (2004) 
  Deeds et al. (1997) 
   
Patents granted + Griliches, Hall and Pakes (1991) 
Patents pending ? Pegels and Thirumurthy (1996) 
Patents licensed ? Hirschey and Richardson (2004) 
Total number of patents ?  
Forward Citation Index + Hirschey and Richardson (2004) 
   
   
   
Backward Citation Index ? Lee (2001) 
   
   
   
Technology Cycle Time ? Hirschey and Richardson (2004) 
   
   
   
* + denotes a positive relationship  
   ?  denotes insufficient information to hypothesize a relationship 
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4  Findings and Analysis 
 
This chapter presents the findings of our study. In Section 4.1, we will present an 
overview of the high-tech IPOs in U.S. Next, Section 4.2 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the test variables. Section 4.3 discusses the findings of the industry factors, 
R&D intensity, number of patents issued, pending, licensed and total number of patents 
on the valuation of high tech IPOs. Section 4.4 reports the descriptive statistics of the test 
variables of patent quality and an overview of the companies in the paired sample. The 
findings of the patent quality i.e. backward citation index, forward citation index and 
technology cycle time in the matched pair sample are reported in Section 4.5. Lastly, 
Section 4.6 concludes this chapter. 
 
4.1 Overview of the High Tech IPO market 
 
Table  4.1 shows the breakdown of the high tech IPOs listed on Nasdaq by year and by 
industry. Almost 54% of all the IPOs are listed in 1999 and 2000 i.e. the Internet bubble 
period (Loughran and Ritter; 2004, Ljungvist and Wilhelm; 2003). In addition, Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) reported that the percentage of high-tech and Internet IPOs increased 
from 30.5% (1990-1998) to 72% (1999-2000). After the burst of the bubble, the number 
of high-tech IPOs fell drastically to 20 IPOs in 2001 and 14 in 2002.  
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In terms of the high-tech sectors, 55% of all the high-tech IPOs are concentrated in the 
Computer, Programming and Software sector, 20% in high-tech manufacturing, 16% in 
the Biotechnology sector and 9% in the Communications industry.  
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Table  4.1 Summary Statistics Of The High-tech IPO Listed On Nasdaq (1996-2002) 
This table lists the total number of high-tech IPOs that are listed from January 1996 till December 2002. The number of high-tech IPOs is broken down into 
their respective sub industrial sectors. IPOs with SIC codes 283, 3841, 3845 and 873 are classified as Biotech; 737 are classified as Computer Programming 











1996 184 39 105 14 26 
1997 112 23 52 6 31 
1998 78 7 50 8 13 
1999 247 12 164 31 40 
2000 224 50 96 21 57 
2001 20 6 9 0 5 
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4.2 Sample characteristics 
 
Table  4.2 presents the sample summary statistics of the test variables. The mean IPO 
market value (calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding by the offer 
price) is $524.68 million while that of market value (calculated using the first day 
closing price) is $875.32 million i.e. an initial underpricing of 66.8%. This is consistent 
with the IPO market phenomenon of initial underpricing (Loughran and Ritter, 2004; 
Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack, 2002). Loughran and Ritter (2004) documented an 
initial underpricing of 14.07% for a sample period of 1990 to 1980 while Aggarwal et al. 
(2002) reported an initial excess return of 50.40% over the sample period of 1994 to 
1999. The higher initial underpricing in our sample is due to several reasons. Firstly our 
sample spans from 1996 to 2002, which is inclusive of the bubble period of 1999 and 
2000. Secondly, our sample focuses on high tech IPOs which probably has a greater 
underpricing due to their nature of high uncertainty apart from the bubble effect. 
 
The mean average 1-year holding period return is –1% and this is consistent with 
previous empirical findings which reported long run underperformance of IPOs. 
Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990 documented abnormal return of –13.79% over a holding 
period of 250 trading days. Ritter (1991) reported a 3-year cumulative abnormal return of 
-29.13%. Our sample has a lower long run underperformance as compared to past 
literature. This could be because our sample period coincided with the Internet bubble 
period when stock prices jumped to unusually high levels. As postulated in past 
literature, long run underperformance is due to mean reverting fads in the IPO market 
where the market typically overreacts to the listing of new issues thus leading to 
mispricing of these newly listed stocks on their first day of trading. When investors’ 
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initial over-optimism weakens, prices will revert to their intrinsic levels (Aggarwal and 
Rivoli, 1990). However it is possible that during the Internet bubble period, investors’ 
initial over-optimism persisted until perhaps the burst of the bubble. As such the IPOs 
did not revert to their intrinsic levels. 
 
The mean number of patents issued is 5.16 with a median of 0. In fact, the vast majority 
of firms (67.2%) do not have patents and only 288 firms (32.8%) out of the total of 879 
firms in the sample reported (in their prospectuses) having at least 1 patent issued. One 
plausible reason for the low number of patents could be because most of the firms in the 
sample are young firms (median age of 5 years) and the process of applying for and 
getting a patent usually takes up to 2 years (the mean number of patents pending is 
higher at 7.78). In comparison, Hirschey and Richardson (2001) reported a mean number 
of patent of 61.96 and a median of 22. Our figures are much lower because Hirschey and 
Richardson (2001) sample focuses on established high tech companies that are actively 
patenting in the U.S with at least 10 patents per year during the sample period while our 
sample are young firms with only 32.8% of the companies reporting having patents in 
their prospectuses.  
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Table  4.2 Summary statistics of 879 High Tech IPOs 
The total sample consists of 879 high-tech IPOs listed from January 1996 to December 2002. 
OFFVAL is the IPO value calculated by multiplying number of shares outstanding after offer 
with IPO offer price. LOFF is the natural log of OFFVAL. FSTVAL is the IPO value calculated 
by multiplying number of shares outstanding after offer with first day closing price and LFST is 
the natural log of FSTVAL. AHPR is the 1-year average holding period return. LAGECO is the 
natural logarithm of the age of the IPO firm. RNDINT is the R&D intensity i.e. R&D expenses 
divided by total assets for the year prior to IPO. P_ISSUE is the number of patents granted to the 
company. P_PEND is the number of patents pending. P_LICENSE is the number of patents the 
company licensed. P_ TOTAL is the total number of patents.  
 
  Mean Median Std dev Variance 
OFFVAL 524.68 178.00 2329.77 5427831.08 
LOFF 18.82 19.00 2.28 5.18 
FSTVAL 875.32 217.65 4336.03 18801123.38 
LFST 19.29 19.21 1.42 2.03 
AHPR -1% -22% 120% 143% 
LAGECO 6.61 5.00 5.37 28.83 
RNDINT 0.36 0.22 1.12 1.26 
P_ISSUE 5.16 0.00 49.02 2403.06 
P_PEND 7.78 0.00 34.13 1164.58 
P_LICENSE 0.33 0.00 3.30 10.90 
P_TOTAL 13.27 1.00 62.50 3906.55 
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4.3 Analysis of multivariate regressions 
 
Table  4.123 shows the Pearson Correlation Matrix of the independent variables used in 
the regression models. We observe that NASDAQ and YRDUMMY is highly correlated 
which might result in a multicollinearity problem. However given that the condition 
index of the multivariate regression models is less than 20 we believe multicollinearity is 
not a serious problem in our regression analyses. 
 
4.3.1 Industry effects 
 
From Column 1 of Table  4.4, we can see that the coefficient of the Biotechnology 
dummy is -0.614 (significant at the 1% level), High Tech Manufacturing dummy is         
-0.250 (significant at 10% level) and Computer Programming & Software is -0.2977 
(significant at 5% level). Hence we can infer that investment bankers value 
Biotechnology, High Tech Manufacturing and Computer Programming & Software IPOs 
significantly lower than that of Communication industry.  
 
On the other hand, from Column 2 of Table  4.4, we can observe that the market as 
determined by the first day closing price do not value High Tech Manufacturing IPOs 
differently from Communications IPOs. Column 3 of Table  4.4 shows that in the long 
run, the 1-year average holding period return of the various industries’ is insignificantly 
different from that of the Communications. 
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Table  4.3 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
The total sample consists of 879 high-tech IPOs listed from January 1996 to December 2002. LOFF is the natural log of IPO value calculated using offer price and LFST is that of 
first day closing price. AHPR is the 1-year average holding period return. HIRISK is 1 if there is a high-risk warning on the cover of the prospectus. LAGECO is the natural 
logarithm of the age of the firm. EMPLOYEE is the number of employees. MGTEXP is the number of management personnel with management experience. NOTOPVC is the 
number of top VCs. PRODUCT is the number of products under development. EQRET is the % of equity retained by the management. UREP is 1 if the IPO is managed by a 
prestigious underwriter. YRDUMMY is 1 if the IPO is in 1999-2000. NASDAQ is the level of Nasdaq index 2 weeks prior to IPO. RNDINT is the R&D intensity. P_ISSUE is the 
number of patents granted to the company. P_PEND is the number of patents pending. P_LICENSE is the number of patents the company licensed. P_TOTAL is the total number of 
patents.  
 
 AHPR HIRISK LAGECO EMPLOYEE MGTEXP NOTOPVC PRODUCT EQRET UREP YRDUMMY NASDAQ RNDINT 
AHPR 1.00                       
HIRISK -0.01 1.00                     
LAGECO -0.01 0.09 1.00                   
EMPLOYE 0.00 -0.11 0.05 1.00                 
MGTEXP 0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.02 1.00               
NOTOPVC 0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 0.20 1.00             
PRODUCT -0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 1.00           
EQRET 0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.18 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 1.00         
UREP 0.15 -0.11 -0.11 0.02 0.16 0.19 -0.07 0.05 1.00       
YRDUMMY 0.02 -0.40 -0.16 -0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.08 -0.04 0.17 1.00     
NASDAQ -0.02 -0.36 -0.12 0.03 -0.20 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.84 1.00   
RNDINT 0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.20 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 1.00 
P_ISSUE 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.35 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.00 
P_PEND 0.00 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.14 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.11 0.03 
P_LICENSE 0.00 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.05 -0.09 -0.09 0.02 
P_TOTAL 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.26 -0.04 -0.04 0.12 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.01 
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Table  4.4 Multivariate Regression to determine the industry effects 
The total sample consists of 879 high-tech IPOs listed from January 1996 to December 2002. 
LOFF is the natural log of IPO value calculated using offer price and LFST is that of first day 
closing price. AHPR is the 1-year average holding period return. HIRISK is 1 if there is a high-
risk warning on the cover of the prospectus, 0 otherwise. LAGECO is the natural logarithm of 
the age of the IPO firm. EMPLOYEE is the number of employees in the firm. MGTEXP is the 
number of management personnel with management experience. NOTOPVC is the number of 
top venture capitalists. PRODUCT is the number of products under development. EQRET is the 
percentage of equity retained by the management after the offering. UREP is 1 if the IPO is 
managed by a prestigious underwriter, 0 otherwise. NASDAQ is the average Nasdaq returns for 
the two weeks before the firm goes public. YRDUMMY is 1 if the IPO is in 1999-2000 (Internet 
bubble). BIO is 1 if the firm is in the biotech industry. HTM is 1 if the IPO is in the High Tech 
Manufacturing industry. CPS is 1 if the firm is in the Computer programming and Software 
industry. The base industry is Communications. P value in brackets. 
  LOFF LFST AHPR 
  1 2 3 
(Constant) 17.9440*** 18.1122*** 0.1239 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.641) 
HIRISK -0.1411 -0.2029** 0.0063 
  (0.105) (0.038) (0.948) 
LAGECO -0.0793 -0.0889 0.0155 
  (0.179) (0.183) (0.813) 
EMPLOYEE 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.936) 
MGTEXP 0.0454*** 0.0566*** -0.0096 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.455) 
NOTOPVC 0.1589** 0.1918** -0.0249 
  (0.026) (0.020) (0.753) 
PRODUCT 0.0292 0.0282 -0.0039 
  (0.174) (0.240) (0.869) 
EQRET 0.0286 0.0291 0.0067 
  (0.091) (0.122) (0.721) 
UREP 0.3789*** 0.6548*** 0.3657*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NASDAQ 0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0001** 
  (0.000) (0.005) (0.041) 
YRDUMMY 0.2186 0.5322*** 0.2823* 
  (0.138) (0.001) (0.085) 
BIO -0.6140*** -0.7866*** 0.0633 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.723) 
HTM -0.2501* -0.2105 0.0691 
  (0.087) (0.208) (0.671) 
CPS -0.2977** -0.2782* -0.0720 
  (0.022) (0.063) (0.619) 
Adjusted R2 0.2497 0.3061 0.0155 
F statistics 23.4236 29.8149 2.0611 
*** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance 
 
Chapter 4: FINDINGS & ANALYSIS  
 
42  
4.3.2 R&D intensity 
We can see from Table  4.5 Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 that R&D investments have an 
insignificant impact on the offer value and first day IPO value. This is contrary to many 
past findings that reported a significant positive impact of R&D investments on firm 
value (Lev and Sougiannis; 1996, Chauvin and Hirschey; 1993, Chan, Martin and 
Kensinger; 1990). Intuitively we would expect R&D, which is an essential investment 
for high tech firms to be valued.  
 
One plausible reason for the contradictory results could be that our study focuses on firm 
value at IPO stage while past studies focus on established firm share value. In addition, 
the firms in our sample are relatively young and that R&D investments contributes to the 
long term growth of the firm. However the outcomes of R&D investments are highly 
uncertain and there is no verification of effectiveness or efficiency with which firms are 
using their R&D resources. Hence the investment bankers and the public value R&D 
investments negatively.9 In addition, compared to past studies, our study focuses on 
valuation during IPO where there is much more uncertainty and noise which could be a 
possible reason why we are unable to pick up the value of R&D expenditure. 
 
Another possibility for the discrepancy could be that our study uses current year R&D 
scaled by total assets instead of capitalized R&D as suggested by past studies. We could 
not capitalize R&D firstly because most of the firms in our sample has short operating 
history. Secondly, most firms do not report more than the last 3 years of their financial 
                                                
9 As our sample has 162 firms without R&D expenditure for the year prior to IPO, we also run the 
regression on firms with non-zero R&D intensity to check if that was the reason for the insignificant 
coefficient. However the results were similar. In addition, given that 54% of our firms are listed in the 
Internet bubble period, we also run regression on a sample of 405 firms (excluding those in the bubble 
period). The coefficients of R&D intensity were also insignificant. 
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history in the prospectuses. Thirdly, we are unable to have an economically driven 
amortization rate (Ho et al.; 2004) Thus for reasons of parsimony; we used R&D 
expenditure instead of capitalized R&D.  
 
Column 3 of Table 4.5 shows that R&D intensity has no impact on 1 year AHPR. 
However Column 6 shows a significant and positive relationship between R&D intensity 
with 1 year AHPR when industry dummies are included. Thus we can infer that the 
impact of R&D intensity on 1 year AHPR is industry specific. From Column 6, we can 
see that the impact on the four industries are different. In the communications industry 
(the base industry in the regression), there is a significant and positive relationship 
between R&D intensity and 1-year AHPR (coefficient = 1.15). While the relationship 
between R&D intensity and 1-year AHPR in Biotechnology is significantly positive, 
R&D has a smaller impact on AHPR (coefficient = 0.04). 10 Similarly, there is a 
significant and positive relationship between R&D intensity and 1-year AHPR in the 
High Tech Manufacturing and Computer Programming & Software industries 
(coefficient = 0.5 and 0.13 respectively).
11
 The findings show strong support that the 
future share price performance of a firm is positively related to R&D intensity of the 
firm. In addition, this gives credibility to our earlier argument that R&D contributes to 
the long term growth of the firm. 
 
                                                
10 Coefficient of R&D on 1-year AHPR (BIO) = 1.1467 – 1.1042 = 0.0425 
11 Coefficient of R&D on 1-year AHPR (HTM) = 1.1467 – 1.0944 = 0.0523 
Coefficient of R&D on 1-year AHPR (CPS) = 1.1467 – 1.0195 = 0.1272 
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Taking a closer look at the control variables, we can see that the number of management 
personnel with prior management experience has a significant positive impact on IPO 
value. This is consistent with the findings in Tan (2003) that the market view the number 
of management personnel with prior management experience as an indication of the 
quality of the human capital of the firm. 
 
The coefficients of the underwriter prestige with IPO value and 1-year average holding 
period returns are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that 
IPOs with prestigious lead underwriters have higher IPO value. This finding supports the 
certification hypothesis that reputable underwriters helps to reduce uncertainty. (Beatty 
and Ritter, 1986; Michaely and Shaw, 1994). 
 
The coefficient of the number of top venture capitalists with IPO value is positive and 
statistically significant at 5% level. Our findings is consistent with Lerner’s (1994) 
findings that the number of top venture capitalists backing the IPO signals firm value. 
 
Nasdaq returns has a significant positive impact on IPO value. This implies that the IPO 
value is higher when the market is doing well. However Nasdaq returns has a significant 
negative impact on 1-year average holding period returns. This is consistent with Ritter’s 
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Table  4.5 Multivariate Regression Models to determine the impact of R&D 
The total sample consists of 879 high-tech IPOs listed from January 1996 to December 2002. 
LOFF is the natural log of IPO value calculated using offer price and LFST is that of first day 
closing price. AHPR is the 1-year average holding period return. RNDINT is the R&D intensity. 
BIO is 1 if the firm is in biotech. HTM is 1 if the IPO is in High Tech Manufacturing. CPS is 1 if 
the firm is in Computer programming and Software. The base industry is Communications. 
HIRISK is 1 if there is a high-risk warning on the cover of the prospectus, 0 otherwise. 
LAGECO is the natural logarithm of the age of the IPO firm. EMPLOYEE is the number of 
employees in the firm. MGTEXP is the number of management personnel with management 
experience. NOTOPVC is the number of top venture capitalists. PRODUCT is the number of 
products under development. EQRET is the percentage of equity retained by the management 
after the offering. UREP is 1 if the IPO is managed by a prestigious underwriter, 0 otherwise. 
NASDAQ is the average Nasdaq returns for the two weeks before the firm goes public. 
YRDUMMY is 1 if the IPO is in 1999-2000 (Internet bubble). P-value in brackets. 
  LOFF LFST AHPR LOFF LFST AHPR 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
(Constant) 17.9759*** 18.1442*** 0.1161 17.9980*** 18.1577*** 0.0326 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.664) (0.000) (0.000) (0.904) 
RNDINT -0.0525 -0.0651* 0.0512 -0.2012 -0.2912 1.1467** 
  (0.115) (0.096) (0.167) (0.676) (0.587) (0.032) 
BIO*RNDINT       0.1574 0.2281 -1.1042** 
        (0.744) (0.671) (0.040) 
HTM*RNDINT       0.0795 0.4534 -1.0944** 
        (0.871) (0.466) (0.045) 
CPS*RNDINT       0.1933 0.1159 -1.0195* 
        (0.707) (0.840) (0.075) 
HIRISK -0.1346 -0.1939** -0.0001 -0.1355 -0.1914* -0.0158 
  (0.123) (0.048) (0.999) (0.123) (0.053) (0.871) 
LAGECO -0.0834 -0.0927 0.0153 -0.0849 -0.0909 0.0126 
  (0.161) (0.169) (0.817) (0.154) (0.178) (0.849) 
EMPLOYEE 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.985) (0.000) (0.000) (0.949) 
MGTEXP 0.0452*** 0.0565*** -0.0098 0.0450*** 0.0569*** -0.0110 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.447) (0.000) (0.000) (0.398) 
NOTOPVC 0.1612** 0.1951** -0.0253 0.1608** 0.1916** -0.0206 
  (0.024) (0.018) (0.749) (0.024) (0.021) (0.795) 
PRODUCT 0.0339 0.0340 -0.0083 0.0332 0.0339 -0.0087 
  (0.118) (0.161) (0.732) (0.127) (0.163) (0.718) 
EQRET 0.0289* 0.0296 0.0066 0.0291* 0.0291 0.0063 
  (0.087) (0.116) (0.725) (0.086) (0.122) (0.736) 
UREP 0.3710*** 0.6459*** 0.3679*** 0.3692*** 0.6477*** 0.3681*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NASDAQ 0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0001** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0001* 
  (0.000) (0.008) (0.047) (0.000) (0.008) (0.056) 
YRDUMMY 0.2316 0.5475*** 0.2737* 0.2368 0.5446*** 0.2466 
  (0.116) (0.001) (0.095) (0.110) (0.001) (0.134) 
BIO -0.5856*** -0.7501*** 0.0339 -0.6052*** -0.7738 0.1430 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.851) (0.000) 0.000 (0.447) 
HTM -0.2349 -0.1966 0.0563 -0.2239 -0.2841 0.1556 
  (0.109) (0.240) (0.730) (0.154) 0.152 (0.372) 
CPS -0.2954** -0.2751* -0.0767 -0.3205** -0.2693 0.0059 
  (0.024) (0.066) (0.597) (0.028) 0.107 (0.971) 
  
Adjusted R2 0.2479 0.3061 0.0155 0.2471 0.3039 0.0178 
F statistics 23.4236 29.8149 2.0611 17.8494 22.7232 1.9329 
*** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance 
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4.3.3 Patents issued  
Table  4.6 reveals that the coefficients of the number of patents issued are statistically 
insignificant across all the 6 regression models. Hence, our hypotheses H1 and H2 that the 
number of patents issued is positively related to IPO value and 1-year AHPR are not 
supported.  
 
One reason for the counterintuitive findings could be that there is a large ‘noise’ component 
in the use of patent count as a measure of the firm value. Pakes and Shankerman (1984) and 
Griliches, Hall and Pakes (1987) have shown that the distribution of the market value of the 
patents is very skewed i.e. a few patents may have extremely high market value, while the 
remaining majority have low values.  
 
On a similar note, the number of patents may not be correlated to the benefits and importance 
of the patent. For example, compare a patent of an invention that is one of its kind versus 
another which is an incremental innovation to the current technology, the patent of a new 
invention would be of greater benefits and value to the IPO firm than the latter. Hence 
perhaps the market places more emphasis on the quality of patents instead of the quantity.  
 
4.3.4  Patents pending 
Table  4.7 Column 4 shows that the number of patents pending is positively related to the 
offer value and first day value of IPO in the Communications industry (the base industry in 
the regression) and is statistically significant at 10% level (coefficient =0.0309 and 0.0328 
respectively. However the number of patents pending is significant and negative related to the 
firm IPO value (both offer value and first day value) in the Biotechnology industry 
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(coefficient= -0.001 and -0.0008 respectively).12 A possible explanation could be that in the 
biotechnology industry, because of its complexity it takes a longer time for the patent to be 
granted. Hence the patented invention may be common and ordinary, though it could be 
inventive when it was filed (Farnley, Morey and Diana Sternfeld, 2004). In addition, 
according to Farnley et al. (2004), biotechnology is a science where ultimate goals are 
achieved step by step, and each step might contribute something inventive. If each of those 
steps is patented, a single product may use several separate patented inventions. Furthermore, 
according to Jones (2002), the time a patent is granted to the time the product is ready to 
market is much longer in the biotechnology industry especially the pharmaceutical companies 
(Refer to Appendix 3 for a pictorial representation).13 Hence we can see why a patent pending 
is not worth much in the biotechnology industry. 
 
In addition, comparing Column 4 of Table  4.5 and Column 4 of Table  4.7 we can see that 
the adjusted R2 is higher for the model including the number of patents pending (0.2471 and 
0.2510 respectively) hence it shows that the number of patents pending helps to explain the 
value of the IPO firm. 
 
However we can see from Column 3 and 6 of Table  4.7 that the coefficients of the number of 
patents pending are statistically insignificant. One possible explanation could be that the 
process of patent application usually takes up to 2 years and hence the outcome of the patents 
pending might still be uncertain after 1 year. 
 
                                                
12 Coefficient of PPEND on LOFF (Biotechnology) = 0.0309 – 0.0319 = -0.001 
Coefficient of PPEND on LFST (Biotechnology) = 0.0328 – 0.0336 = -0.0008 
13 Adapted from presentation slides of Professor Trevor M Jones, March 2002. Professor Trevor is from Kings 
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Table  4.6 Multivariate Regression to determine the impact of Patents issued 
The total sample consists of 879 high-tech IPOs listed from January 1996 to December 2002. LOFF is 
the natural log of IPO value calculated using offer price and LFST is that of first day closing price. 
AHPR is the 1-year average holding period return. P_ISSUE is the number of patents granted to the 
company. RNDINT is the R&D intensity. BIO is 1 if the firm is in biotech. HTM is 1 if the IPO is in 
High Tech Manufacturing. CPS is 1 if the firm is in Computer programming and Software. The base 
industry is Communications. HIRISK is 1 if there is a high-risk warning on the cover of the 
prospectus, 0 otherwise. LAGECO is the natural logarithm of the age of the IPO firm. EMPLOYEE is 
the number of employees in the firm. MGTEXP is the number of management personnel with 
management experience. NOTOPVC is the number of top venture capitalists. PRODUCT is the 
number of products under development. EQRET is the percentage of equity retained by the 
management after the offering. UREP is 1 if the IPO is managed by a prestigious underwriter, 0 
otherwise. NASDAQ is the average Nasdaq returns for the two weeks before the firm goes public. 
YRDUMMY is 1 if the IPO is in 1999-2000 (the Internet bubble period). P-value in brackets. 
  LOFF LFST AHPR LOFF LFST AHPR 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
(Constant) 17.9714*** 18.1432*** 0.1128 17.9811*** 18.1234*** 0.1216 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.674) (0.000) (0.000) (0.653) 
P_ISSUE -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0016 0.0394 -0.0168 
  (0.682) (0.943) (0.790) (0.956) (0.241) (0.604) 
BIO*P_ISSUE       0.0030 -0.0346 0.0182 
        (0.920) (0.307) (0.578) 
HTM*P_ISSUE       -0.0021 -0.0397 0.0166 
        (0.942) (0.238) (0.609) 
CPS*P_ISSUE       -0.0004 -0.0368 0.0077 
        (0.990) (0.298) (0.822) 
RNDINT -0.0525 -0.0650* 0.0513 -0.0496 -0.0618 0.0526 
  (0.116) (0.096) (0.167) (0.138) (0.115) (0.158) 
BIO -0.5819*** -0.7493*** 0.0366 -0.6128*** -0.7357*** 0.0013 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.840) (0.000) (0.000) (0.995) 
HTM -0.2307 -0.1958 0.0594 -0.2242 -0.1461 0.0396 
  (0.117) (0.243) (0.717) (0.139) (0.396) (0.814) 
CPS -0.2945** -0.2749* -0.0761 -0.2936** -0.2337 -0.0868 
  (0.02) (0.07) (0.60) (0.03) (0.13) (0.56) 
HIRISK -0.1336 -0.1937** 0.0006 -0.1271 -0.1871* 0.0034 
  (0.126) (0.049) (0.995) (0.147) (0.058) (0.972) 
LAGECO -0.0844 -0.0928 0.0146 -0.0904 -0.1025 0.0160 
  (0.156) (0.169) (0.826) (0.131) (0.130) (0.811) 
EMPLOYEE 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.938) (0.000) (0.000) (0.969) 
MGTEXP 0.0452*** 0.0565*** -0.0098 0.0452*** 0.0567*** -0.0094 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.448) (0.000) (0.000) 0.469 
NOTOPVC 0.1606** 0.1950** -0.0258 0.1614** 0.1990** -0.0291 
  (0.024) (0.018) (0.745) (0.024) (0.016) (0.714) 
PRODUCT 0.0344 0.0341 -0.0079 0.0291 0.0275 -0.0083 
  (0.113) (0.161) (0.743) (0.189) (0.267) (0.737) 
EQRET 0.0284* 0.0294 0.0062 0.0284* 0.0293 0.0061 
  (0.094) (0.119) (0.741) (0.095) (0.121) (0.748) 
UREP 0.3723*** 0.6461*** 0.3689*** 0.3728*** 0.6412*** 0.3716*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NASDAQ 0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0001** 0.0003*** 0.0002** -0.0001* 
  (0.000) (0.008) (0.049) (0.000) (0.011) (0.054) 
YRDUMMY 0.2316 0.5475*** 0.2737* 0.2326 0.5526*** 0.2690 




 0.2483 0.3047 0.0152 0.2469 0.3044 0.0129 
F statistics 20.2260 25.7191 1.8982 16.9047 21.5639 1.6362 
*** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance
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Table  4.7 Multivariate Regression to determine the impact of Patents Pending 
The total sample consists of 879 high-tech IPOs listed from January 1996 to December 2002. LOFF is 
the natural log of IPO value calculated using offer price and LFST is that of first day closing price. 
AHPR is the 1-year holding period return. P_PEND is the number of patents pending. RNDINT is 
R&D intensity. BIO is 1 if the firm is in biotech. HTM is 1 if IPO is in High Tech Manufacturing. 
CPS is 1 if the firm is in Computer programming and Software. The base industry is 
Communications. HIRISK is 1 if there is a high-risk warning on the cover of the prospectus. 
LAGECO is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm. EMPLOYEE is number of employees. 
MGTEXP is the number of management personnel with management experience. NOTOPVC is the 
number of top venture capitalists. PRODUCT is the number of products under development. EQRET 
is the % of equity retained by management after the offering. UREP is 1 if the IPO is managed by a 
prestigious underwriter. NASDAQ is the average Nasdaq returns for the 2 weeks before the firm goes 
public. YRDUMMY is 1 if the IPO is in 1999-2000 (Internet bubble). P-value in brackets. 
  LOFF LFST AHPR LOFF LFST AHPR 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
(Constant) 17.9727*** 18.1391*** 0.1178 17.9268*** 18.0751*** 0.1306 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.660) (0.000) (0.000) (0.630) 
P_PEND -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0309* 0.0328* -0.0064 
  (0.788) (0.714) (0.895) (0.073) (0.088) (0.738) 
BIO*P_PEND       -0.0319* -0.0336* 0.0066 
        (0.066) (0.081) (0.731) 
HTM*P_PEND       -0.0274 -0.0327 0.0067 
        (0.126) (0.102) (0.740) 
CPS*P_PEND       -0.0216 -0.0255 0.0065 
        (0.245) (0.217) (0.752) 
HIRISK -0.1354 -0.1951** 0.0003 -0.1389 -0.1987** 0.0020 
  (0.121) (0.047) (0.998) (0.112) (0.044) (0.984) 
LAGECO -0.0826 -0.0914 0.0149 -0.0865 -0.0948 0.0156 
  (0.165) (0.175) (0.822) (0.146) (0.160) (0.814) 
EMPLOYEE 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.986) (0.000) (0.000) (0.981) 
MGTEXP 0.0452*** 0.0566*** -0.0099 0.0455*** 0.0573*** -0.0100 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.446) (0.000) (0.000) (0.440) 
NOTOPVC 0.1609** 0.1946** -0.0252 0.1630** 0.1955** -0.0259 
  (0.024) (0.019) (0.751) (0.022) (0.018) (0.745) 
PRODUCT 0.0341 0.0342 -0.0083 0.0304 0.0311 -0.0082 
  (0.117) (0.160) (0.730) (0.162) (0.202) (0.737) 
EQRET 0.0289** 0.0295 0.0066 0.0287* 0.0292 0.0067 
  (0.087) (0.117) (0.725) (0.089) (0.120) (0.724) 
UREP 0.3710*** 0.6459*** 0.3679*** 0.3496*** 0.6273*** 0.3700*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NASDAQ 0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0001** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0001** 
  (0.000) (0.008) (0.047) (0.000) (0.008) (0.047) 
YRDUMMY 0.2311 0.5467*** 0.2739* 0.2287 0.5468*** 0.2745* 
  (0.117) (0.001) (0.095) (0.120) (0.001) (0.095) 
RNDINT -0.0528 -0.0655* 0.0514 -0.0545 -0.0671* 0.0515 
  (0.113) (0.094) (0.166) (0.102) (0.086) (0.166) 
BIO -0.5776*** -0.7374*** 0.0295 -0.4851*** -0.6420*** 0.0139 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.872) (0.004) (0.001) (0.942) 
HTM -0.2330 -0.1937 0.0553 -0.1983 -0.1225 0.0406 
  (0.113) (0.248) (0.735) (0.206) (0.495) (0.817) 
CPS -0.2951** -0.2747* -0.0769 -0.2510* -0.2176 -0.0909 




 0.2482 0.3048 0.0151 0.2510 0.3058 0.0118 
F statistics 20.2173 25.7317 1.8945 17.2507 21.7007 1.5800 
*** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance
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4.3.5 Patents licensed 
 
From Table  4.8 we can see that the coefficients of the number of patents that the firm 
licensed are statistically insignificant. Thus suggests that the number of patents licensed 
has no bearing on firms’ value.14 The insignificant result could be because of the small 
sample, as most of the companies do not mention the patents they licensed in the 
prospectuses. Moreover the value of a patent arises from the fact that it grants the 
company exclusivity and monopoly rights. However patents that are licensed may not be 
an exclusive license and the patents might also be licensed by other companies. 
 
 
                                                
14 There were only 28 firms that licensed their patents (or at least it was stated so in the prospectuses). A 
separate regression was run with the small sample however the results were also insignificant. 
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Table  4.8 Multivariate Regression to determine the impact of Patents Licensed 
The total sample consists of 879 high-tech IPOs listed from January 1996 to December 2002. LOFF is 
the natural log of IPO value calculated using offer price and LFST is that of first day closing price. 
AHPR is the 1-year average holding period return. P_LICENSE is the number of patents licensed. 
RNDINT is the R&D intensity. BIO is 1 if the firm is in biotech. HTM is 1 if the IPO is in High Tech 
Manufacturing. CPS is 1 if the firm is in Computer programming and Software. The base industry is 
Communications. HIRISK is 1 if there is a high-risk warning on the cover of the prospectus, 0 
otherwise. LAGECO is the natural logarithm of the age of the IPO firm. EMPLOYEE is the number 
of employees in the firm. MGTEXP is the number of management personnel with management 
experience. NOTOPVC is the number of top venture capitalists. PRODUCT is the number of products 
under development. EQRET is the percentage of equity retained by the management after the 
offering. UREP is 1 if the IPO is managed by a prestigious underwriter, 0 otherwise. NASDAQ is the 
average Nasdaq returns for the two weeks before the firm goes public. YRDUMMY is 1 if the IPO is 
in 1999-2000 (Internet bubble). P-value in brackets. 
  LOFF LFST AHPR LOFF LFST AHPR 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
(Constant) 17.9748*** 18.1437*** 0.1176 17.9711*** 18.1419*** 0.1120 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.661) (0.000) (0.000) (0.677) 
P_LICENSE 0.0028 0.0014 -0.0040 0.4931 0.5028 -0.4256 
  (0.805) (0.908) (0.751) (0.648) (0.675) (0.724) 
BIO*P_LICENSE       -0.4889 -0.4995 0.4217 
        (0.651) (0.677) (0.726) 
HTM*P_LICENSE       -0.5671 -0.6007 0.3844 
        (0.601) (0.618) (0.750) 
CPS*P_LICENSE       -0.4571 -0.4797 0.8416 
        (0.683) (0.700) (0.500) 
HIRISK -0.1364 -0.1948** 0.0024 -0.1419 -0.2020** 0.0074 
  (0.119) (0.048) (0.980) (0.107) (0.042) (0.940) 
LAGECO -0.0829 -0.0924 0.0146 -0.0813 -0.0906 0.0194 
  (0.164) (0.171) (0.826) (0.173) (0.180) (0.770) 
EMPLOYEE 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.984) (0.000) (0.000) (0.984) 
MGTEXP 0.0452*** 0.0565*** -0.0098 0.0450*** 0.0562*** -0.0096 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.450) (0.000) (0.000) (0.459) 
NOTOPVC 0.1610** 0.1950** -0.0251 0.1589** 0.1920** -0.0269 
  (0.024) (0.018) (0.752) (0.026) (0.020) (0.735) 
PRODUCT 0.0337 0.0339 -0.0079 0.0333 0.0333 -0.0079 
  (0.121) (0.163) (0.743) (0.126) (0.172) (0.744) 
EQRET 0.0290* 0.0296 0.0066 0.0289* 0.0295 0.0066 
  (0.087) (0.116) (0.726) (0.088) (0.117) (0.727) 
UREP 0.3697*** 0.6452*** 0.3698*** 0.3716*** 0.6480*** 0.3638*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NASDAQ 0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0001** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0001** 
  (0.000) (0.008) (0.046) (0.000) (0.008) (0.049) 
YRDUMMY 0.2314 0.5474*** 0.2739* 0.2259 0.5403*** 0.2715* 
  (0.116) (0.001) (0.095) (0.126) (0.001) (0.099) 
RNDINT -0.0522 -0.0649* 0.0508 -0.0524 -0.0649* 0.0502 
  (0.118) (0.098) (0.172) (0.117) (0.098) (0.176) 
BIO -0.5904*** -0.7527*** 0.0407 -0.5865*** -0.7493*** 0.0332 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.823) (0.000) (0.000) (0.856) 
HTM -0.2354 -0.1968 0.0570 -0.2192 -0.1771 0.0552 
  (0.109) (0.240) (0.727) (0.138) (0.294) (0.737) 
CPS -0.2952** -0.2750* -0.0770 -0.2893** -0.2685* -0.0884 




 0.2482 0.3047 0.0152 0.2466 0.3034 0.0141 
F statistics 20.2163 25.7199 1.9003 16.8712 21.4686 1.6929 
*** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance
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4.3.6 Total number of patents 
 
Table  4.9 shows the regression results of the total number of patents owned by the 
company on the firm offer value, first day IPO value and 1-year AHPR. Focusing on 
Column 5 of Table  4.9, we can see that the first day investors valued the total number of 
patents for firms in the Communications industry positively and the coefficient is 
statistically significant at 10% level. In comparison, the total number of patents in the 
Biotechnology and High Tech manufacturing IPOs were valued less (statistically 
significant at 10% level).  
 
As mentioned earlier, a biotechnology patent takes longer to be granted hence the 
patented invention may be common and ordinary, though it could be inventive when it 
was filed (Farnley, Morey and Diana Sternfeld, 2004). In addition, according to Farnley 
et al. (2004), in the biotechnology industry, a single product may use several separate 
patented inventions. Thus the reason why patents in biotechnology industry are valued 
less than the patents in the Communications industry.  A possible reason as to why 
patents in high tech manufacturing are valued less could be that compared to patents in 
the other industries, it is probably easier to understand and hence easier to reverse 
engineer. 
 
Column 4 of Table  4.9 reveals that there is insufficient evidence to establish a 
relationship between the total number of patents and offer value. This suggests 
that investment bankers do not see the total number of patents as an important 
intangible asset of the firms. This could be because as mentioned earlier, the 
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number of patents has no implications on the value and quality of the patents. 
Moreover the patent is only valuable if the firm is able to turn the innovation into 
a commercialized product. Take the case of Xerox, they owned the first patents to 
laser printing and came up with the first laser printer in 1978.15 However, they 
failed to see the need of the mainstream market of having a smaller and more 
affordable printer. Thus, in 1984, Hewlett Packard commercialized the first 
desktop laser printer. Today, Hewlett Packard is the industry leader in the printer 
industry.  
 
In addition, the effectiveness of having patents as a protection of intellectual 
property is debatable. This is because if the patent holder believes that a patent 
has been infringed, he may bring suit against those who make, use or sell the 
offending product. (Besen and Raskind, 1991)  For start-ups, they have limited 
resources and many are in fact reluctant to waste money and engage in patents 
lawsuits. Thus although patents can serve as deterrents to imitation, it does not 
provide full protection to start ups. As most of the companies in the sample are 
young firms they might not have the resources to defend their patents, this might 
be a possible explanation to why investment bankers do not see the value in the 
patents. 
 
                                                
15 Source: www.inventors.about.com 
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Similarly, we have insufficient evidence to establish a relationship between the 
total number of patents and 1-year AHPR. 
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Table  4.9 Multivariate Regression to examine the impact of total number of patents 
 
The total sample consists of 879 high-tech IPOs listed from January 1996 to December 2002. LOFF is 
the natural log of IPO value calculated using offer price and LFST is that of first day closing price. 
AHPR is the 1-year average holding period return. P_TOTAL is the total number of patents. RNDINT 
is the R&D intensity. BIO is 1 if the firm is in biotech. HTM is 1 if the IPO is in High Tech 
Manufacturing. CPS is 1 if the firm is in the Computer programming and Software industry. The base 
industry is Communications. HIRISK is 1 if there is a high-risk warning on the cover of the 
prospectus, 0 otherwise. LAGECO is the natural logarithm of the age of the IPO firm. EMPLOYEE is 
the number of employees in the firm. MGTEXP is the number of management personnel with 
management experience. NOTOPVC is the number of top venture capitalists. PRODUCT is the 
number of products under development. EQRET is the percentage of equity retained by the 
management after the offering. UREP is 1 if the IPO is managed by a prestigious underwriter, 0 
otherwise. NASDAQ is the average Nasdaq returns for the two weeks before the firm goes public. 
YRDUMMY is 1 if the IPO is in 1999-2000 (Internet bubble). P-value in brackets. 
  LOFF LFST AHPR LOFF LFST AHPR 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
(Constant) 17.9690*** 18.1394*** 0.1135 17.9306*** 18.0778*** 0.1290 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.672) (0.000) (0.000) (0.635) 
P_TOTAL -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0154 0.0228* -0.0061 
  (0.647) (0.797) (0.879) (0.204) (0.094) (0.650) 
BIO* P_TOTAL       -0.0158 -0.0231* 0.0063 
        (0.193) (0.090) (0.640) 
HTM*P_TOTAL       -0.0158 -0.0231* 0.0059 
        (0.192) (0.090) (0.662) 
CPS* P_TOTAL       -0.0105 -0.0186 0.0041 
        (0.419) (0.202) (0.776) 
HIRISK -0.1343 -0.1938** 0.0000 -0.1345 -0.1966** 0.0016 
  (0.124) (0.049) (1.000) (0.124) (0.046) (0.987) 
LAGECO -0.0836 -0.0926 0.0152 -0.0877 -0.0979 0.0154 
  (0.160) (0.170) (0.818) (0.142) (0.148) (0.816) 
EMPLOYEE 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.980) (0.000) (0.000) (0.959) 
MGTEXP 0.0453*** 0.0566*** -0.0098 0.0454*** 0.0570*** -0.0099 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.448) (0.000) (0.000) (0.446) 
NOTOPVC 0.1604** 0.1945** -0.0256 0.1624** 0.1984** -0.0266 
  (0.024) (0.019) (0.746) (0.023) (0.016) (0.738) 
PRODUCT 0.0345 0.0343 -0.0081 0.0319 0.0316 -0.0074 
  (0.113) (0.158) (0.739) (0.143) (0.195) (0.762) 
EQRET 0.0285* 0.0292 0.0064 0.0282* 0.0289 0.0063 
  (0.093) (0.121) (0.732) (0.096) (0.125) (0.738) 
UREP 0.3723*** 0.6467*** 0.3684*** 0.3617*** 0.6319*** 0.3735*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NASDAQ 0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0001** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0001** 
  (0.000) (0.008) (0.049) (0.000) (0.009) (0.050) 
YRDUMMY 0.2312 0.5474*** 0.2735* 0.2349 0.5518*** 0.2728* 
  (0.117) (0.001) (0.096) (0.111) (0.001) (0.097) 
RNDINT -0.0528 -0.0652* 0.0511 -0.0537 -0.0664* 0.0521 
  (0.113) (0.096) (0.168) (0.108) (0.090) (0.162) 
BIO -0.5742*** -0.7425*** 0.0381 -0.5096*** -0.6488*** 0.0043 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.835) (0.003) (0.001) (0.982) 
HTM -0.2294 -0.1932 0.0584 -0.1730 -0.1114 0.0405 
  (0.119) (0.250) (0.722) (0.259) (0.524) (0.813) 
CPS -0.2943** -0.2744* -0.0763 -0.2589* -0.2110 -0.0899 




 0.2484 0.3048 0.0151 0.2482 0.3052 0.0122 
F statistics 20.2298 25.7250 1.8949 17.0147 21.6492 1.5973 
*** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance
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4.4 Overview of the matched pair sample 
 
As mentioned earlier in Section 3.2, to control for skewness in our data, we matched our 
sample of 55 companies with patent statistics in NUS patent database with another 55 
companies from our original sample. The companies were matched by 1) industry group, 
2) firm size and 3) year of issue. Table  4.10 shows the breakdown of the matched pair 
sample by industry, year of IPO issue and age of IPO firm. We can see that there are 
most high tech manufacturing IPOs in the sample, followed by Computer programming 
and software, Biotechnology and Communications. In addition, most of the IPOs are 
listed in 1999 and 2000, which are otherwise known as the bubble period. Lastly, most of 
the IPO firms are young firms, 75% of them are 10 years and below. 
 
4.4.1 Characteristics of the matched pair sample 
 
Table  4.11 presents the summary statistics of the test variables in the matched pair 
sample regressions. Similarly, we find initial underpricing in our matched pair sample of 
IPO. In comparison with our sample of 879 firms, the matched pair sample appears to 
have a greater level of underpricing. In addition, the mean number of backward citation 
is 9.7. The mean forward citation within 1-year of patent issue (0.5) is half of the mean 
of the total forward citation within 5 year or up to IPO (1). All the four citation statistics 








Table  4.10 Overview of the matched pair sample 
 
Breakdown by Industry Group 
Industry Group Frequency 
Biotechnology 30 
Communications 2 
Computer programming and software 34 
High tech manufacturing 44 
Total 110 
Breakdown by Year of IPO issue 









Breakdown by Age of IPO firm 














Table  4.11 Characteristics of the matched pair sample 
The matched pair sample consists of 110 high-tech IPOs. (See Appendix 1 for the list of the 
firms). OFFVAL is the IPO value calculated by multiplying number of shares outstanding after 
offer with IPO offer price. LOFF is the natural log of IPO value calculated using offer price. 
FSTVAL is the IPO value calculated by multiplying number of shares outstanding after offer 
with first day closing price and LFST is the natural log of FSTVAL. AHPR is the 1-year average 
holding period return. RNDINT is the R&D intensity i.e. R&D expenses divided by total assets 
for the year prior to IPO. PC is the patent count derived from NUS database. BCI is the backward 
citation index. FC1 is the forward citation within 1 year of patent issue. TTFC is the total 
forward citation within 5 year of patent issue or up to firm’s IPO. TCT is the technology cycle 
time.  
 
 Mean Median Std dev Variance 
OFFVAL 566.537 202.450 1291.672 1668417.410 
LOFF 19.113 19.126 1.410 1.989 
FSTVAL 1062.358 246.419 3237.578 10481913.182 
LFST 18.946 19.323 3.552 12.616 
AHPR -0.062 -0.302 0.965 0.932 
RNDINT 0.417 0.297 0.519 0.269 
PC 4.464 0.500 12.433 154.581 
BCI 9.717 0.000 26.363 694.985 
FC1 0.469 0.000 1.076 1.158 
TTFC 0.970 0.000 1.909 3.643 
TCT 3.417 1.000 4.425 19.585 
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4.5 Analysis of Multivariate regressions 
 
Table  4.12 shows the Pearson Correlation Matrix of the independent variables used in 
the regression models. The correlation coefficient for forward citation within 1 year and 
total forward citation within 5 year or up to IPO is 0.64 however this is not a problem as 
they are not in the same regression model. The coefficient between backward citation 
index and forward citation within 1 year and total forward citation within 5 year or up to 
IPO is 0.67 and 0.44 respectively. However the condition index of the multivariate 
regression models is less than 20 hence we believe multicollinearity is not a problem in 
our regression analyses.  
 
4.5.1 Forward citation index 
 
Table  4.13 shows the regression results of the matched pair sample. Columns 1, 2 and 3 
shows the regression results of using forward citation within 1-year of patent issue as a 
proxy for quality of patent and technological significance while Columns 4, 5 and 6 
reports the regression results of using total forward citation within 5 year of patent issue 
or up to IPO as the proxy. 
 
We can see from Column 1 of Table 4.13 that there is a negative relationship, which is 
statistically significant at 10% level, between forward citation within 1-year of patent 
issue and IPO value (calculated using offer price multiply by shares outstanding after 
offer). Similarly Column 4 shows that total forward citation is negatively correlated 
 60  
 
Table  4.12 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
HIRISK is 1 if there is a high-risk warning on the cover of the prospectus, 0 otherwise. MGTEXP is the number of management personnel with management experience. 
NOTOPVC is the number of top venture capitalists. PRODUCT is the number of products under development. EQRET is the percentage of equity retained by the 
management after the offering. UREP is 1 if the IPO is managed by a prestigious underwriter, 0 otherwise. NASDAQ is the average Nasdaq returns for the two weeks before 
the firm goes public. RNDINT is the R&D intensity i.e. R&D expenses divided by total assets for the year prior to IPO. PC is the patent count derived from NUS database. 
BCI is the backward citation index. FC1 is the forward citation within 1 year of patent issue. TTFC is the total forward citation within 5 year of patent issue or up to firm’s 
IPO. TCT is the technology cycle time.  
 
  HIRISK MGTEXP NOTOPVC PRODUCT EQRET UREP NASDAQ RNDINT PC BCI FC 1 TTFC TCT 
HIRISK 1.00                         
MGTEXP 0.01 1.00                       
NOTOPVC 0.11 0.28 1.00                     
PRODUCT -0.04 -0.19 -0.04 1.00                   
EQRET 0.14 0.06 0.05 -0.07 1.00                 
UREP 0.10 0.11 0.19 -0.06 0.01 1.00               
NASDAQ -0.38 -0.18 -0.12 -0.05 -0.16 0.00 1.00             
RNDINT -0.11 0.03 -0.06 0.10 -0.16 -0.14 0.08 1.00           
PC -0.04 0.22 0.05 -0.08 -0.27 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 1.00         
BCI -0.03 0.13 0.02 -0.08 -0.17 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.15 1.00       
FC 1 0.04 0.10 0.07 -0.06 -0.14 0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.18 0.67 1.00     
TTFC -0.02 0.13 0.23 -0.10 -0.14 0.02 -0.09 -0.04 0.48 0.40 0.64* 1.00   
TCT -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.05 0.02 0.26 0.28 0.23 0.26 1.00 
*FC1 and TTFC are not in the same regression hence the high collinearity is not a problem 
Shaded number highlight the relationship between backward citation index and forward citation within 1 year may have high collinearity.




with IPO value (calculated using offer price multiply by shares outstanding after offer) and is 
statistically significant at 5% level. Hence our hypothesis H3 which states that there is a 
significant and positive relationship between the Forward Citation index and the firm’s IPO 
value is not supported.  
 
A possible reason for the contradicting results could be that most empirical studies focus on 
established organizations while our study focuses on high tech firms during IPO (Hirschey 
and Richardson; 2001, Lerner; 1994). Hence perhaps during IPO, there is too much 
uncertainty and noise to pick up the effect of forward citation index. Another reason could be 
that according to Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) there is “substantial noise in the patent 
citations data.” 
 
In addition, there is insufficient evidence to conclude a relationship between forward citation 
and IPO value as determined by first day closing price. Furthermore, from Columns 3 and 6 
of Table  4.13, we can see that the coefficients for both the forward citation indices are 
statistically insignificant. Therefore, our hypothesis H4 which states that forward Citation 
index is positively related to the firm’s 1-year holding period return is not supported. 
 
4.5.2 Backward citation index 
 
From Columns 1 and 4 of Table  4.13, we can see backward citation index is positively and 
statistically significant (at 10% level) correlated with IPO value (calculated using offer price 
multiply by shares outstanding after IPO). Our results shows that the more times a particular 
patent cites previous patents as previous research, the more likely it is to encompass a wider 
range of research and is an indication of high patent quality. Another possible rationale for 




the finding could be that, given the stringent process of attaining a patent, the fact that a 
patent can be granted despite the many other patents its cited infers that it has probably made 
a valuable contribution to existing technology. 
 
However, Columns 2 and 5 show that there is insufficient evidence to establish a relationship 
between backward citation index and IPO value determined by first day closing price. One 
possible reason could be that citation statistics are not presented in the prospectuses hence not 
valued by the first day investors. 
 
In addition, we can see that the coefficients of backward citation index in column 3 and 6 are 
statistically insignificant hence we do not have sufficient evidence to establish a relationship 
between backward citation index and 1-year holding period returns. 
 
4.5.3 Technology Cycle Time 
 
Our findings from Table  4.13 do not support the presence of any significant relationship 
between technology cycle time and IPO value and between technology cycle time and 1-year 








Table  4.13 Regression of the matched pair sample 
The total sample consists of 879 high-tech IPOs listed from January 1996 to December 2002.  LOFF 
is the natural log of IPO value calculated using offer price and LFST is that of first day closing price. 
AHPR is the 1-year average holding period return. FC1 is the forward citation within 1 year of patent 
issue. TTFC is the total forward citation within 5 year of patent issue or up to firm’s IPO. BCI is the 
backward citation index. TCT is the technology cycle time. PC is the patent count derived from NUS 
patent database. RNDINT is the R&D intensity i.e. R&D expenses divided by total assets for the year 
prior to IPO. BIO is 1 if the firm is in the biotech industry. HIRISK is 1 if there is a high-risk warning 
on the cover of the prospectus, 0 otherwise. MGTEXP is the number of management personnel with 
management experience. NOTOPVC is the number of top venture capitalists. PRODUCT is the 
number of products under development. EQRET is the percentage of equity retained by the 
management after the offering. UREP is 1 if the IPO is managed by a prestigious underwriter, 0 
otherwise. NASDAQ is the average Nasdaq returns for the two weeks before the firm goes public. P-
value in brackets. 
 
  LOFF LFST AHPR LOFF LFST AHPR 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
(Constant) 16.8312*** 14.8665*** -0.5149 17.0164*** 14.8667*** -0.5851 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.323) (0.000) (0.000) (0.267) 
FC 1 -0.2669* -0.0360 0.1158       
  (0.072) (0.919) (0.329)       
TTFC       -0.1857** -0.0054 0.0730 
        (0.021) (0.977) (0.261) 
BCI 0.0116* 0.0129 -0.0067 0.0097* 0.0121 -0.0057 
  (0.064) (0.373) (0.181) (0.067) (0.319) (0.184) 
TCT -0.0233 -0.0470 -0.0025 -0.0221 -0.0473 -0.0029 
  (0.412) (0.466) (0.913) (0.431) (0.463) (0.900) 
PC 0.0053 0.0428* -0.0013 0.0157 0.0429 -0.0053 
  (0.611) (0.073) (0.879) (0.173) (0.106) (0.569) 
RNDINT -0.2115 0.3008 0.0275 -0.2175 0.3039 0.0286 
  (0.364) (0.569) (0.883) (0.345) (0.565) (0.878) 
HIRISK -0.5306* -1.1747* -0.2513 -0.6160** -1.1787* -0.2162 
  (0.071) (0.079) (0.285) (0.034) (0.079) (0.357) 
MGTEXP 0.0937** -0.0760 -0.0288 0.0842** -0.0763 -0.0251 
  (0.020) (0.401) (0.371) (0.036) (0.402) (0.437) 
NOTOPVC 0.5302** 0.1956 0.0776 0.6456*** 0.1950 0.0332 
  (0.014) (0.687) (0.651) (0.004) (0.700) (0.852) 
PRODUCT 0.0570 0.0866 0.0108 0.0504 0.0866 0.0134 
  (0.168) (0.356) (0.744) (0.218) (0.357) (0.686) 
EQRET 0.2932 4.1489*** 0.8032 0.3602 4.1533*** 0.7753 
  (0.648) (0.005) (0.123) (0.571) (0.005) (0.135) 
UREP 0.4993** 2.0958*** 0.4106** 0.4524* 2.0968*** 0.4288** 
  (0.042) (0.000) (0.038) (0.063) (0.000) (0.031) 
NASDAQ 0.0005*** 0.0008*** 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0008*** 0.0001 
  (0.000) (0.007) (0.438) (0.001) (0.008) (0.365) 
  
Adjusted R 0.2796 0.2131 0.0014 0.2947 0.2130 0.0047 
F statistics 4.5256 3.4369 1.0130 4.7959 3.4357 1.0425 
*** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance 
 




Table  4.14 summarizes the findings of this study. Firstly, we find that R&D intensity 
does not have an impact on IPO value however it is significantly and positively related to 
1 year average holding period returns.  
 
Secondly, our findings reveal that patents issued and patents licensed do not help to 
explain IPO value nor 1 year average holding period returns.  
 
Thirdly, we discover that in the Communications Industry, patents pending has a 
significant and positive relationship with IPO value. On the other hand, patents pending 
has a significant negative impact on IPO value in the Biotechnology industry.  
 
Fourthly, we find that total number of patents has a significant positive impact on First 
day IPO value for the Communications IPOs. The total number of patents has a 
significant positive relationship with First day IPO value for Biotechnology IPOs.  
 
In addition, our findings reveal that forward citation within 1 year of patent issue and 
total forward citation within 5 year of patent issue has a significant negative impact on 
IPO value.  
 
We also find that backward citation index has a significant positive impact on IPO value. 
However it has no impact on 1-year average holding returns. 
 
Lastly, our results for technology cycle time on IPO value and 1-year average holding 
period returns is inconclusive. 
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Table  4.14: Summary of Findings 
LOFF is the natural log of IPO value calculated using offer price and LFST is that of first day 
closing price. AHPR is the 1-year average holding period return. RNDINT is the R&D intensity 
i.e. R&D expenses divided by total assets for the year prior to IPO. ISSUE is the number of 
patents granted to the company. PEND is the number of patents pending. LICENSE is the 
number of patents the company licensed. TOTAL is the total number of patents. FC1 is the 
forward citation within 1 year of patent issue. TTFC is the total forward citation within 5 year of 
patent issue or up to firm’s IPO. BCI is the backward citation index. TCT is the technology cycle 
time. 
 
 LOFF LFST AHPR  
RNDINT NS NS +S  














FC1 -S -S NS H3 & H4 not supported 
TTFC -S -S NS  
BCI +S +S NS  
TCI NS NS NS  
+ S denotes positive and significant relationship. 
-S denotes negative and significant relationship. 
(COM) denotes findings in the Communications industry. 
(BIO) denotes findings in the Biotechnology industry. 
NS denotes findings not significant. 
 




This chapter begins with a summary of the study in Section 5.1. The implications of this 
study are discussed in Section 5.2. The limitations encountered in our research are 
presented in Section 5.3. Finally, Section 5.4 provides suggestions for future research 
and development of this study. 
 
5.1 Summary of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the value relevance of intangibles namely; R&D 
investments, patent quality and patent count in explaining the variation in the firm’s IPO 
value and 1 year holding period returns.  
 
We use forward citation index, backward citation index and technology cycle time to 
proxy for the quality of patents. We also have four different constructs of patent counts 
namely, patents granted, patents pending, patents licensed and total number of patents.  
 
In addition, we examine the impact of patent counts and R&D investments on the 
different sub category of high tech firms namely Biotechnology, Computer Programming 
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5.1.1  Summary of the findings on valuation of high-tech IPOs 
 
We find a significant and positive relationship between R&D intensity and 1 year 
holding period return. Hence we can infer that R&D investments is useful in explaining 
future stock market performance. 
 
In addition, we discover that in the Communications Industry, patents pending has a 
significant and positive relationship with IPO value. On the other hand, patents pending 
has a significant negative impact on IPO value in the Biotechnology industry.  
 
We also find that total number of patents has a significant positive impact on First day 
IPO value for the Communications IPOs. The total number of patents has a significant 
positive relationship with First day IPO value for Biotechnology IPOs.  
 
However, there is insufficient evidence to establish the value relevance of patents issued 
and patents licensed in explaining the IPO value and 1 year holding period return. 
Therefore, there is inconclusive evidence to support hypotheses H1 and H2. 
 
We find a negative and significant relationship between forward citation index and IPO 
value and 1 year holding period return. Hence, our hypotheses H3 and H4 are not 
supported. 
 
In addition, we also find that total forward citation within 5 year of patent issue has a 
significant negative impact on IPO value.  
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We also find that backward citation index has a significant positive impact on IPO value. 
Hence, we can infer that the more times a patent cites previous research, the better the 
quality of the patent and the higher the IPO value. However backward citation index has 
no impact on 1-year average holding returns. 
 
Lastly, the findings reveal that technology cycle time has no impact on both IPO value 
and 1-year holding period return. 
 
In short, although we do not have sufficient evidence to support our hypotheses, we have 
interesting findings on the impact of R&D on 1-year holding period returns, patents 
pending and backward citation index. 
 
5.2 Research Implications 
 
Our results provide the following implications for management of high-tech firms. First, 
there is a strong positive relationship between R&D investments and the 1-year holding 
period return. Hence high-tech firms should ensure that they maintain a strong portfolio 
of R&D investments. 
  
In addition, our findings also show that there is a strong positive relationship between the 
patents pending and the value of the IPO in the Communications industry. Hence firms 
in the Communications industry should ensure that they keep abreast with the latest 
technology in their area of business and constantly engage in research and development 
to develop more patents. 
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Our results show that backward citation signals patent value and hence the positive 
relationship between IPO value and backward citation index. Thus scientists of the high 
tech firms should ensure that they conduct an extensive research of prior art when filing 
for patents. 
 
Consistent with our previous study, we find that the quality of the firm’s management 
team is important in explaining the valuation of the high-tech IPO. Our results show that 
there is a strong positive relationship between prior management experience and value of 
the company. Hence entrepreneurs should bear this in mind while assembling their 
management team. 
 
Lastly, investors have to take note of the value drivers in the high tech company that they 
invest in. In the long run, it appears that patent count and patent quality are not indicative 




There are several limitations related to our study. Firstly, for reasons of parsimony, we 
used R&D expenditure instead of capitalized R&D in the computation of R&D intensity. 
R&D expenditure was used because most of the firms in our sample have short operating 
history and many others do not report more than the last 3 years of their financial history 
in the prospectuses. Furthermore, we are unable to have an economically driven 
amortization rate (Ho et al.; 2004). 
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Secondly, the huge amount of data analysis required in the collection, extraction and 
computation of the variables used in this study constrain the number of firms in our 
sample. As a result, our study only focuses on IPOs listed on Nasdaq stock exchange. As 
such the findings should be interpreted with care in case of other countries. 
 
Thirdly, in the computation of citation statistics, we could not account for patents filed 
under the inventor name, as they were not reflected in the Assignee list in NUS patent 
database.  
 
5.4 Suggestions for future research 
 
Further research can also reconstruct the empirical methodology of this study, by 
examining the ability of the financial and non-financial variables in predicting future 
abnormal earnings by using Ohlson (1995) framework, or to examine the non-linear 
relationships between patents and returns. 
 
Further research can be conducted on the citation statistics to examine the relationship 
between these indicators and R&D investment, or on their ability to predict eventual 
product innovations. 
 
This study can be extended to other countries such as Germany, Canada, and Japan to 
test the role of non-financial data on the valuation of the high-tech IPOs. This can help to 
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Adolor Corp 2000 47 Biotech Esperion Therapeutics Inc 2000 48 
Monolithic System Technology 2001 48 Biotech Seattle Genetics Inc 2001 46 




national Research Corp 1997 64 Biotech ILEX Oncology Inc 1997 64 
Cerus Corp 1997 70 Biotech CombiChem 1998 73 
Geron Corp 1996 82 Biotech Digene Corp 1996 81 
Corixa Corp 1997 82 Biotech Neurocrine Biosciences Inc 1996 84 
Luminex Corp 2000 87 Biotech Arena Pharmaceuticals Inc 2000 85 




Diversa Corp 2000 102 Biotech Rigel Pharmaceuticals Inc 2000 102 
Genaissance Pharmaceuticals 2000 113 Biotech ViroLogic Inc 2000 110 
Large Scale Biology Corp 2000 128 Biotech Lexicon Genetics Inc 2000 127 
Dyax Corp 2000 152 Biotech First Horizon Pharmaceutical 2000 150 
Invitrogen Corp 1999 221 Biotech Orchid BioSciences Inc 2000 220 
ZymoGenetics Inc(Novo Nordisk) 2002 309 Biotech Eon Labs Inc 2002 355 
Omnipoint Corp 1996 174 Communications Net2Phone Inc 1999 171 
Immersion Corp 1999 53 high tech mfg Interspeed Inc 1999 56 









Carrier Access Corp 1998 125 high tech mfg Cobalt Networks Inc 1999 127 
Virage Logic Corp 2000 126 high tech mfg Lantronix Inc 2000 128 
Pericom Semiconductor Corp 1997 137 high tech mfg Ace*Comm Corp 1996 137 
Innova Corp 1997 138 high tech mfg Corsair Communications Inc 1997 132 
AirNet Communications Corp 1999 153 high tech mfg MP3.COM Inc 1999 142 
QuickLogic Corp 1999 156 high tech mfg 
Copper Mountain Networks 
Inc 
1999 154 
Verilink Corp 1996 157 high tech mfg Extreme Networks Inc 1999 159 
interWAVE Communications 2000 166 high tech mfg Elastic Networks Inc 2000 166 
NVidia Corp 1999 184 high tech mfg Telaxis Communications Corp 2000 184 
Finisar Corp 1999 186 high tech mfg Accord Networks Ltd 2000 180 
Juniper Networks 1999 190 high tech mfg Western Multiplex Corp 2000 194 
Emcore Corp 1997 204 high tech mfg XYLAN Corp 1996 209 
CIEna Corp 1997 225 high tech mfg Avici Systems Inc 2000 226 
Cylink Corp 1996 265 high tech mfg Powerwave Technologies Inc 1996 265 
Metawave Communications Corp 2000 272 high tech mfg 
Marvell Technology Group 
Ltd 
2000 274 
Applied Micro Circuits Corp 1997 287 high tech mfg Extended Systems Inc 1998 269 
McData Corp 2000 473 high tech mfg Endwave Corp 2000 448 
Maxtor Corp 1998 5578 high tech mfg ChipPAC Inc 2000 3851 
Intersil Corp 2000 5693 high tech mfg Amkor Technology Inc 1998 9100 
Digimarc Corp 1999 73 Computer Programming & software software.net Corp 1998 75 
E-Stamp Corp 1999 75 Computer Programming & software Neon Systems Inc 1999 77 
Peerless Systems Corp 1996 87 Computer Programming & software BroadVision Inc 1996 88 
NetIQ Corp 1999 111 Computer Programming & software Mpath Interactive Inc 1999 111 




Datalink Corp 1999 135 Computer Programming & software Watchguard Technologies Inc 1999 134 
Interactive Pictures Corp 1999 138 Computer Programming & software Data Return Corp 1999 139 
Scientific Learning Corp 1999 139 Computer Programming & software Red Hat Inc 1999 140 
InterTrust Technologies Corp 1999 144 Computer Programming & software ViaGrafix Corp 1998 145 
CyberSource Corp 1999 146 Computer Programming & software Juno Online Services Inc 1999 147 
Echelon Corp 1998 154 Computer Programming & software Clarent Corp 1999 155 
SalesLogix Corp 1999 177 Computer Programming & software Autobytel.com Inc 1999 180 
Vixel Corp 1999 178 Computer Programming & software Vitria Technology Inc 1999 180 
Informatica Corp 1999 200 Computer Programming & software iVillage Inc 1999 200 
Gensym Corp 1996 226 Computer Programming & software i2 Technologies Inc 1996 228 
TALX Corp 1996 234 Computer Programming & software ULTRADATA Corp 1996 238 
ShowCase Corp 1999 240 Computer Programming & software SQL Financials International 1998 244 






Appendix 2 Computation of Holding period returns (HPRs) 
 
The holding period return ( tiHPR , ) is used to take into account the unrealized returns 
that IPO investors will earn by buying and holding onto the issue over an event period. It 









j rHPR - 1 
where  i
k
jHPR  is the holding period return of security i from month t = j to t = k. 
 tir ,  is the raw return of security i on month t. 
 
The corresponding benchmark holding period return to security i from the event month t 
is calculated as follows: 







j tRHPR -1 
where tm
k
jHPR , is the corresponding holding period return of the market portfolio or the 
corresponding required holding period returns for security i from month t = j to t 
= k  










                                                 
16 Adapted from presentation slides of Professor Trevor M Jones, March 2002. Retrieved at 
http://www.bcbiotech.ca/userfiles/page_attachments/2371933_Distinguished_Speaker_TrevorJones_26March2002.pps 
